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Abstract 
In recent years, the management of physical assets has become increasingly important, even more so, in 
asset intensive organisations. This research work presents an overall approach to quantify reliability of 
rolling stock assets in the rail environment. The current maintenance management system in the case 
studied is over-reliant on cancellations and delays as reliability measure. The objectives of this study 
were, therefore, to develop a scientific approach to quantify the reliability of the rolling stock fleet and 
to develop a maintenance planning model based on system reliability. The research methodology 
followed made use of failure statistics, failure distributions and the interdependence of different systems 
to determine the impact of component failures on the overall system reliability. This could then be used 
to determine the reliability of individual train sets in order to better understand their performance. The 
reliability measure could be used for predicting component and train set failures as well as to better 
understand the contribution of maintenance towards reliability, hence the term Reliability Based 
Maintenance. The model, validated with real data, illustrates how the reliability measure can be used to 
determine maintenance intervals of different train sets. Based on the results, recommendations are made 
in relation to future planning of the maintenance strategy. 
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Opsomming 
Die bestuur van fisiese bates het in die afgelope tyd meer belangrik geword, veral in organisasies wat 
afhanklik is van hulle fisiese bates. Hierdie navorsing stel ‘n metode voor wat die betroubaarheid van 
rollende materiaal bates in die spoor bedryf kwantifiseer deur gebruik te maak van falingstatistiek. In 
die huidige instandhouding bestuurstelsel van die gevallestudie word daar te veel gesteun op kansellasies 
en vertragings van treine as ‘n betroubaarheids meting. Daarom was die doelwitte van die navorsing om 
‘n wetenskaplike benadering te ontwikkel om betroubaarheid van rollende materiaal the kwantifiseer, 
en om ‘n instandhouding beplannings model voor te stel, gebaseer op sisteem betroubaarheid. Die 
navorsingsmetodologie is gebaseer op falingstatistieke, falingverspreidings, en die interafhanklikheid 
van stelsels word gebruik om die invloed van komponent falings op die betroubaarheid van die totale 
stelsel te bepaal. Hierdie benadering word dan gebruik om die betroubaarheid van individuele treinstelle 
en die werksverrigting van individuele trainstelle te bepaal. Hierdie instandhouding meting kan gebruik 
word om falings van komponente en treinstelle te voorspel, asook om die bydrae van instandhouding 
tot betroubaarheid beter te verstaan, daarom genoem Betroubaarheids Gebaseerde Instandhouding. Dit 
is ook geïllustreer hoe die betroubaarheid meting gebruik kan word om instandhouding intervalle te 
bepaal. Die betroubaarheid model is met werklike data gevalideer en aanbevelings word gemaak hoe 
om betroubaarheid te gebruik om die toekomstige beplanning van instandhouding te doen. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
An effective rail system depends on the seamless integration of a number of complex systems, thus, if 
one system fails, the service can be severely affected. Reliability, availability, maintainability and safety 
(RAMS) are seen as major contributors to the quality of service. These are well covered and adapted for 
railways in the British Standard European Norm (BS EN) 50126 [1]. The standard recognises that 
railway safety and availability are inter linked (Figure 1.1) and regards them as the most important 
elements. As such, railway safety and availability can only be achieved if all the reliability and 
maintainability requirements are achieved. The quality of railway service is not only influenced by the 
four elements, RAMS, but also by operations, maintenance and other factors as shown in Figure 1.1.   
 
 
Figure 1.1: Factors contributing to the quality of railway service [1] 
While all the elements of RAMS are important in the management of physical assets, the focus of this 
study will be on quantifying the reliability of railway rolling stock and the application of reliability 
techniques in order to define a forward looking and leading reliability measure. A case study method is 
employed, using data from a South African rail operator, Metrorail, a subsidiary of PRASA (Passenger 
Rail Agency of South Africa). Metrorail operates an aging rolling stock fleet making predominant use 
of Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) during predetermined maintenance inspection intervals.  
1.1 Research Problem 
The benefits of an effective maintenance strategy and maintenance techniques can only be seen after 
being implemented for a period of time. In a study by Huisman et al [2] of the Netherlands Railways, 
rolling stock management is classified as a strategic planning process with a time horizon of between 
10 to 20 years. This indicates that the maintenance strategy and techniques must be carefully selected 
because incorrect maintenance techniques can have a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of the 
business in the long term.  
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Observations at Metrorail led to the formulation of the research objectives, which were identified around 
the selection of the most appropriate maintenance technique. In 2009, Metrorail acknowledged that 
maintenance of train sets was not effective, with many wasteful activities related to over maintaining. 
Metrorail adopted CBM as a maintenance technique [3]. This meant that instead of the periodic 
replacement of components irrespective of condition, components would only be replaced after a 
condition assessment has been done. The frequency of maintenance interventions remained unchanged 
at two weeks, but the focus of maintenance shifted. The problem associated with CBM is that the 
condition is normally classified based on the visual condition of the mechanical and/or electrical systems 
and performance measurements from metrology. Consequently, non-condition related failures (e.g. 
swelling of interpole coils in a traction motor) cannot be entirely prevented using CBM. Also, CBM 
cannot be used in isolation and across the board for all systems. Therefore, other techniques to quantify 
system reliability in rail transportation, especially in an aging fleet environment, are required.  
1.2 Research Objectives 
At Metrorail, one of the shortcomings in the maintenance management system of the current rolling 
stock fleet, is the over reliance on cancellations and delays as a reliability measure. Cancellations and/or 
delays cannot be directly linked to the source of unreliability, and can therefore not be effectively used 
in the planning of maintenance. This investigation, thus, seeks to quantify system reliability in rail 
transportation, especially in an aging fleet environment. 
 
Based on the shortcomings of the application of the definition of reliability, the primary objective of 
this research is: 
a) To develop a scientific approach to quantify the reliability of the rolling stock fleet, in lieu of 
cancelations and delays.  
 
The frequency of maintenance is questioned, specifically, the waste due to over maintaining, and 
whether a more scientific approach can be found to determine the optimum maintenance interval. This 
lead to the secondary objective, which is: 
b) To develop a maintenance planning model for railway rolling stock based on system reliability. 
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1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
This investigation seeks to develop a model to quantify system reliability in rail transportation in an 
aging fleet environment. The methodology, described in detail in chapter three, is summarised below: 
• A comprehensive literature review on reliability and the advances of reliability thinking is done to 
illustrate the context of reliability in Asset Management. 
• Based on the literature review, a reliability model for rolling stock in the rail environment is 
developed based on the configuration of the current fleet of trains from Metrorail. 
• Using statistical techniques and analysis of failure data obtained from the case study, the model is 
applied to satisfy the research objectives. 
• The application of the model is discussed. 
1.4 Outline of Research 
This study is divided into six chapters. A brief description of each chapter is given below: 
Chapter 1 provides background and the rationale for the research. 
Chapter 2 introduces the general concepts of reliability, discusses techniques used in the application of 
reliability in engineering assets as well as how data can be manipulated and interpreted for use in 
reliability analysis, hereafter called a Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) model.  
Chapter 3 explains the methodology followed to apply the literature research in a case study.  
Chapter 4 shows the application of the RBM model in a case study. Reliability in the rail context is 
discussed where after, the maintenance strategies and techniques of Metrorail are discussed. Through 
the remainder of the chapter, the application of the RBM model at Metrorail as a case study is discussed. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results and the potential areas of application. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research, discusses limitations of the study and proposes direction for future 
research work. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Chapter one provided the background to the study, the problem statement as well as the objectives of 
this study. This chapter introduces the theory on reliability, the importance thereof and the theory behind 
quantifying reliability. The literature review is divided in three parts starting with the broader context 
of reliability in the asset management context, maintenance strategies and maintenance techniques. In 
the last part, the modelling of reliability is discussed as well as the various statistical techniques and 
methods used to quantify reliability.  
2.1 Asset Management System 
In the last couple of years, the management of physical assets has become increasingly important. A 
framework for Physical Asset Management (PAM) was defined by the Institute of Asset Management 
in 2004 and officially released as an Asset Management International Organisation for Standardisation 
(AM ISO) standard in January 2014. The standard is applicable to any organisation where physical 
assets are critical for organisational success. There are two main parts applicable to Asset Management 
(AM), defined as an object (“engineering asset”) and a process of managing that asset [4].  
 
An asset is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “all the property of a person or company which 
may be made liable for the payment of debts” [5]. The key concepts of this definition are that (a) a value 
is attributed to (b) property by (c) a person or company. Thus, an asset is more than just a physical object 
but is seen as an object with value.  
 
An asset can be defined more specifically in the context of AM as an “engineering asset”, which provides 
the means for the realisation of value. Amadi-Echendu et al [4] differentiate between “engineering” 
asset objects and “financial” asset objects. They give examples of financial asset objects such as patent 
rights, trademarks, securities traded on stock exchanges and derivative securities of various sorts, which 
exist only as contracts between legal entities. Engineering objects, which can include land and buildings, 
inventories, equipment, vehicles and equipment, exist independently of any contract and are managed 
by engineering asset managers. Accountants and economists refer to these assets as “real assets” [4]. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relation between financial and engineering assets, where the latter can be linked to 
the base of a pyramid on which the other assets rest. 
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Figure 2.1: Fundamental nature of engineering assets [4] 
AM is defined by ISO 55000 [6] as “coordinated activities of an organisation to realise value from 
assets”. It combines all activities necessary to ensure that an engineering asset provides the means for 
the realisation of value and recognise that all asset types are interdependent. The optimal management 
of engineering assets also involves the management of other assets like information assets, human assets, 
financial assets and other intangible assets, therefore, removing the traditional “silos” between different 
functions.  
 
The emphasis on effective AM processes can be seen in Figure 2.2, where the asset itself is only a single 
block in the bottom triangle, and the processes make up the rest of the figure. It can be seen in Figure 
2.2 that the organisation strategic plan and the AM objectives and strategies are aligned through the AM 
policy by setting the AM commitments [7]. As such, continual improvement drives the sustainability of 
the AM system and the complete life cycle of the asset. 
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Figure 2.2: ISO55001 elements of an Asset Management system [7] 
The AM ISO standards, published as the 55000 family of standards, contain the requirements of an AM 
system but do not specify the design of the system. The context of the AM system is shown in the bottom 
part of Figure 2.2, which lists the typical considerations applicable to each level of AM, from the 
corporate/organisation management level down to the individual asset.  
 
The focus of this study will be on the bottom elements of Figure 2.2, i.e. activities around the 
management of individual assets over their life cycles. The remainder of this study will be focussed on 
physical assets, and the term “engineering asset” will be used selectively. 
2.1.1 Definition of Reliability  
The word reliability developed from the word rely, which is defined as a “sense of dependence or trust 
and perhaps has a notion to fall back on” [8]. It was first used as early as 1816 by the poet Samuel T 
Coleridge, who wrote about his friend who inspired everybody around him with “perfect consistency 
and absolute reliability” [9]. Since then, the concept of reliability has become rather popular and is used 
extensively by the general public as well the technical community.  
 
When used by the technical community, the context and interpretation of the word becomes rather 
specific and can deviate substantially from the popular meaning. Reliability is a mathematical concept 
[10] and there are divergent definitions for reliability used in the context of asset reliability. One of the 
more appropriate and recently used textbook definitions is “the probability that an item will perform its 
intended function for a specific interval under stated conditions” [1]. A variation to this definition by 
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Meeker and Escobar [11] is “the probability that an item will survive until a specific point in time under 
encountered use conditions”.  
 
At a first glance, both definitions seem to be self-explanatory and misinterpretation appears improbable. 
However, the definitions contain four distinct aspects, namely probability, function (survive), time 
interval (point in time) and conditions. Meeker and Escobar [11] highlight the importance of the 
environment in which the item operates (i.e. the conditions) as a critical factor in evaluating the item’s 
reliability. This is supported by Puntis [12] who argues that the equipment supplier should define the 
environment under which the equipment will operate such as the duty cycle, maintenance regime and 
climatic conditions. However, the user of the item has control over the conditions, which can include 
the user’s skill, logistic support, maintenance, environment and user demand profile. As such, any 
numerical measure of reliability is scenario dependent [13].  
 
Besides the importance of the conditions, the acceptance standard for the probability, function and time 
interval must be clear. Without clarity, the definition of reliability will be open for interpretation.   
2.1.2 Quality and Reliability 
Condra [14] looks at reliability from a different angle when he defines reliability as “product 
performance over time” and describes it as “another dimension of quality”. Some of the standard 
definitions for the quality of a product, as summarised by Knezevic and Venkatraman [10], are “it meets 
or exceeds the customer’s stated or implied expectations“, and/or it “does this consistently, over a long 
period”. Quality has both subjective and objective dimensions and is normally measured qualitatively 
depending on individual perceptions [10].  
 
The difference between quality and reliability is that the latter can only be quantified after the item has 
been in the field for some time [11], and places the emphasis on the constant reliability throughout the 
lifetime of the item, and the definition of Condra [14] implies that good quality is important and should 
not be seen in isolation.  
2.1.3 The Significance of Reliability 
Not all organisations see the value in measuring reliability. As such, Smith and Mobley [15] summarise 
five reasons why companies do not measure reliability as follows: 
1. Not all maintenance work is recorded on work orders and valuable failure information, especially 
small failures, are not recorded [16]. 
2. All assets are not loaded on a Computerised Maintenance Management System (CMMS). 
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3. Other metrics provide an adequate level of information, therefore, it is not important to even 
measure the most basic Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). 
4. Maintenance is in a fire fighting mode, reacting to crises, with no time to generate metrics. 
5. There are too many other problems to worry about. 
 
Although asset intensive organisations should recognise the importance of an effective maintenance 
function, the tendency in many organisations is to see maintenance as an expense [17] and not a value 
adding process able to contribute to reliability. The objective of maintenance is to improve reliability 
and maximise equipment availability [18] through scheduled Preventative Maintenance, Replacements 
and Inspections (PMRI) [19]. 
 
There are many reasons why reliability is important. These include reputation, customer satisfaction, 
operation and maintenance cost, repeat business and for a competitive advantage [20]. But from a 
maintenance point of view, reliability will contribute to a higher availability, which is particularly 
important in the context of RAMS. Reliability of physical assets is an engineering discipline [11] on the 
one hand. Reliability analysis, on the other hand, is a systematic approach to analyse the reliability of 
systems, identify and access the frequency and causes of failures in order to control their 
consequences.[21]. 
2.2 Maintenance Strategies, Maintenance Techniques and Reliability 
According to the standard BS EN 50126 [1], maintenance is “the combination of all technical and 
administrative actions, intended to retain a product in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform a 
required function”. Similarly, maintenance of industrial equipment is defined by Pintelon and Gelders 
[18] as “all activities necessary to restore equipment to, or keep it in a specified operating condition”. 
With these definitions and the earlier definitions of reliability, it is clear that maintenance is important 
in enabling an asset to perform a required function. As such, when maintenance is effectively done, the 
product can be regarded as “reliable”. Maintenance is, therefore, one of the key drivers to obtain the 
objectives of reliability. In this regard, as much as 70% of production cost is related to maintenance for 
some industries, and one third of the total maintenance cost is wasted due to uncertainties and 
inefficiencies in maintenance planning [22].  
 
Asset maintenance must not be confused with AM. As can be seen in Figure 2.2, the “maintain” function 
is a single step in the context of AM. AM has more dimensions and is much broader than asset 
maintenance and focusses on the broader life cycle management dimensions among them economics, 
physical performance, risk and human dimensions of the asset [4]. 
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Chan and Shaw [23] identify three states of a system illustrated in Figure 2.3 as: 
1. Operating State (OS), where the system is up and operating, and it can fail. 
2. Failure State (FS), where the system is down and failed. 
3. Maintenance State (MS), where the system is down and in Preventative Maintenance (PM), 
and can either fail and move to the FS state, or be restored to the OS state. 
They recognise that a system can either be in an up or down state, and that during the OS-MS transition 
cycle, PM transforms the state from up to down. Similarly, a failure will transform the system from up 
to down during the OS-FS cycle, and a renewal or replacement will reverse the state. It is important that 
the MS and FS be optimised as they both impact on the reliability and availability of the system.  
 
Figure 2.3: State transition of a repairable system with a PM schedule [23] 
Pham and Wang [24] found that not all maintenance activities improve the condition of an item. They 
thus categorise maintenance according to the degree to which the operating conditions of an item is 
restored. They define the following types of maintenance: 
• perfect maintenance - which restores the operating condition of the system to as-good-as-new. 
• minimal maintenance - which leaves the condition as-bad-as-old. 
• imperfect maintenance -  which brings the condition somewhere between the as bad-as-old and the 
as good-as-new condition. 
• worse maintenance - which increases the failure rate or actual age of the system, without breakdown. 
• worst maintenance - which unintentionally causes a failure or breakdown. 
 
Possible causes identified by Pham and Wang [24] for imperfect, worse or worst maintenance include; 
the repair of the wrong part, partial repair of the fault, replacement with faulty parts and human error. 
 
Maciejewski and Anders [25] proposed an equipment deterioration model based on historical data (refer 
to Figure 2.4). The purpose of the model is to estimate the remaining life of a piece of equipment under 
MS 
FS OS Failure during operation 
Renewal/Replacement 
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a specific maintenance policy. In their model, the condition of the equipment can either be D1 (new, or 
good as new), D2 (minor deterioration stage), or D3 (major deterioration stage). 
 
In the event of no operator intervention, the last stage (D3) is followed by failure (F), which then requires 
extensive repair or replacement to restore the condition to D1. In most cases, however, the operator does 
intervene according to a maintenance policy, where inspections (I) are performed at predetermined 
intervals followed by either Minor Maintenance (M in Figure 2.4), Major Maintenance (MM in Figure 
2.4) or nothing.   
 
After a minor maintenance is performed, major maintenance may be performed immediately or after a 
period. The condition of the equipment cannot improve with a minor maintenance as it will either stay 
the same or deteriorate. After each type of maintenance, the condition of the equipment must be 
determined, in which case it can improve (perfect maintenance), stay the same or deteriorate (worse or 
worst maintenance).   
 
 
Figure 2.4: Graphical representation of the model of equipment deterioration [25] 
2.2.1 Failures and Failure Modes 
Before continuing with the discussion on reliability, a common frame of reference with regard to the 
principles of failures and reliability needs to be defined. A failure occurs whenever a system or 
component no longer operates within the expected or designed specification. This includes both 
breakdowns and out-of-specification performance. The definition of a failure is summarised by Coetzee 
[26] as “an unsatisfactory condition” broadly divided into a potential failure (P in Figure 2.5) and a 
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functional failure (F in Figure 2.5). Coetzee [26] further refers to potential failures as a specific type of 
failures, which is one of the greatest contributions by Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) to the 
theory of maintenance. A functional failure occurs when the equipment is not performing its intended 
function. 
A potential failure is a leading indicator which shows that a functional failure is imminent. The severity 
of the defect and criticality of the asset determines how quick the maintenance response should be. If 
the defect severity is low and asset criticality is low, then there is no panic. A PF interval can be defined 
as the amount of time that elapses between the detection of a potential failure and its deterioration to a 
functional failure [15] (refer to Figure 2.5). It is, therefore, essential that maintenance organisations 
know the PF curve and PF interval on critical equipment to optimally manage the reliability of the plant. 
It is shown, later in this study, how different maintenance techniques can be used to determine potential 
failures before they deteriorates to functional failures. 
 
Figure 2.5: Typical failure curve indicating the PF interval [15] 
Traditional maintenance practitioners believed that most failures of equipment are age related and a 
common mistake was to use a single maintenance technique for all equipment. Failure patterns are often 
used to select the most appropriate maintenance technique where the failure of aging equipment is 
classified into six traditional failure patterns [27][26], namely: 
1. Bathtub pattern, with infant mortality (wear in zone, or running in zone) followed by a period of 
random failure, then by a wear out zone. 
2. Traditional pattern, with an initial random failure rate, with a distinct wear out zone. 
3. Slow aging, where the failure rate is gradually increasing throughout the life. 
4. Best new, with a steep increase of the failure rate, then settling into a random failure rate. 
5. Constant random failure, where the failure rate is constant (random) and not age related. 
6. Worst new, with initial wear in followed by a constant (random) failure rate. 
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It was also believed that most equipment follow the bathtub pattern, but in reality, it is only true for 4% 
of equipment with the majority following the worst new failure pattern [27]. Also, most of the six 
traditional failure patterns can be managed by periodic Time Based Maintenance activities [28].  
 
Ascher and Feingold [29] define a “happy” and a “sad” system. On the one hand, the inter-arrival times 
of failures of an improving (“happy” or ☺) system tend to become larger, and the plot of cumulative 
number of failures will tend to concave down. The inter-arrival times of a deteriorating (“sad” or ) 
system, on the other hand, tend to become smaller, and the plot of cumulative number of failures will 
tend to concave up. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6 with a small sample of failures. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Cumulative number of failures vs cumulative usage for “happy” and “sad” systems 
For the purpose of this study, it may be convenient to visualise a system as a large number of sockets, 
each containing a component which may or may not be alike [29][30][31]. Ascher and Feingold [29] 
define a socket as a “circuit or equipment position, which at any given time, holds a part of a given 
type”. These parts are subject to failure according to a probability distribution, although a component 
failure does not necessarily constitute a system failure. Furthermore, not all failures can be prevented 
by even applying the best maintenance strategy. Thus, such failures need to be predicted using statistical 
methods. This approach forms the focus of this study. 
2.2.2 Maintenance Management Overview 
Garg [32] conducted a literature survey on maintenance management and analysed 142 academic papers 
from which he classified maintenance management into six areas, summarised below and detailed in 
Table 2.1: 
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1. Maintenance optimisation models  
During the past few decades, mechanisation and automation has reduced the number of 
production personnel while there was a significant increase in production equipment. As a 
result, maintenance gained importance as a critical value adding activity. As such, research into 
optimisation of maintenance is done continuously. Because of the advances in information 
technology, maintenance optimisation models are used more frequently lately. This quanlitative 
approach in maintenance optimisation is well covered in literature.  Maintenance optimisation 
covers four aspects [32]: 
• An analysis of a technical system, including its function and importance. 
• The modelling of the failure trends and deterioration of the system over time with 
possible consequences. 
• A description of the information available and actions open to management. 
• An objective function and optimisation technique to suggest the best option. 
The models can be classified as deterministic or stochastic, based on the modelling of the 
deterioration [32].  
 
2. Maintenance techniques and maintenance strategies 
A maintenance strategy is made up of one or more maintenance techniques (also called 
maintenance types). A typical maintenance strategy tree is shown in Figure 2.7. RCM and Total 
Productive Maintenance (TPM) are the two typical types of maintenance strategies, which will 
be explained in detail in the sections that follow. Maintenance is also viewed as a multi-
disciplinary activity involving integration of different strategies. Other maintenance strategies, 
which will not be discussed in detail, owing to the scope of this study, are: 
• Risk Based Maintenance - optimising cost effectiveness and minimising the hazards caused 
by unexpected failure. 
• Effectiveness Centered Maintenance - where the focus is on “doing the right things”, instead 
of the traditional “doing things right” [32]. 
 
3. Maintenance scheduling 
The purpose of maintenance scheduling is to bring together the different elements, which can 
include manpower, machines, methods, materials and metrics, in order to complete a 
maintenance activity on time. There are fundamental differences between maintenance 
scheduling and production scheduling. For example, maintenance scheduling is more stochastic 
in nature and the scheduling of maintenance personnel makes it a challenging problem.  
 
4. Maintenance performance measurement 
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The measurement of maintenance performance is difficult. Although in the past it was limited 
to financial reporting [32], maintenance performance measurement is based on what the user 
perceives to be important. Whereas the management is interested in budgets, engineers will 
focus on techniques, equipment availability, support responsiveness, etc. Various measurement 
techniques can be used among them the balanced scorecard, quality function deployment 
technique, overall equipment effectiveness, performance measurement relationship with the 
maintenance strategy and the effect of maintenance induced failures on operational 
effectiveness [32].  
 
5. Maintenance information systems  
As already mentioned, the advances in information technology have resulted in more areas of 
application. Computers are able to stream and store more data, be more flexible in manipulating 
data, create various types of reports from the data and use data to do effective forecasting. Data 
mining has become a critical skill for maintenance engineers, and equally so, the ability of 
business architecture to accommodate the streamlining of data capturing and reporting.  
 
Amadi-Echendu et al [4] mention that the issue of data capture and information technology 
focus on ways to monitor the condition of assets more effectively in order to prevent premature 
failure of the asset. Madu [33] acknowledges that effective AM systems is facilitated by IT 
software, and that AM is dependent on an effective Enterprise Resource System (ERS) that 
collects data. 
 
6. Maintenance policies. 
A maintenance policy has an important role to play, that of creating a clear vision of the 
maintenance function. This has also been highlighted by the AM ISO 55000 standard and 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Table 2.1: Maintenance management classification 
 
Maintenance area Sub area 
Maintenance 
optimisation models 
Bayesian approach 
Mixed integer linear programming formulation 
Multiple criteria decision making approach 
Fuzzy linguistic approach 
Gailbraith approach 
Simulation 
Markovian probabilistic models 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Petrinets 
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Organisation modelling 
Maintenance 
techniques 
Preventive Maintenance (PM) 
Condition-Based Maintenance. (CBM) 
Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) 
Computerised Maintenance Management Systems (CMMS) 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) 
Predictive Maintenance (PdM) 
Maintenance outsourcing 
Effectiveness Centered Maintenance 
Strategic Maintenance Management 
Risk-Based Maintenance 
Maintenance 
scheduling 
Techniques (e.g. CBM, PdM, PM) 
Wear out component 
Repair rate modifying activities 
Combining production and maintenance 
Maintenance personnel 
Maintenance 
performance 
measurement 
Techniques (e.g. Balanced Scorecard, Quality Function Deployment, 
Maintenance Information Systems, Total Maintenance Management, system 
audit approach) 
Overall Equipment/Craft Effectiveness 
Relation with maintenance strategy 
Maintenance 
information system 
Opportunity created by information technology 
Computerises data based info system 
Development of decision support systems 
Maintenance policies Maintenance integration 
Maintenance concepts 
New ideas 
 
Whereas Garg [32] focussed on many elements of an AM system (Table 2.1), the focus in this study 
will be on the maintenance techniques and maintenance strategies used to manage the physical assets. 
2.2.3 Maintenance Strategies and Techniques 
The terms maintenance strategies and maintenance techniques were found to be used interchangeably, 
which was also highlighted by Vlok [31]. Therefore, in the context of this research, a maintenance 
technique is seen as a sub-task of a strategy. Thus, a strategy is seen as the overall direction an 
organisation wants to follow, consisting of one or more maintenance techniques. 
 
Maintenance strategies consist of one or more maintenance techniques. These techniques, summarised 
in Figure 2.7, will be briefly discussed in this section. The traditional maintenance techniques, namely 
reactive, preventative and proactive maintenance, are often not used independent and the strengths of 
different techniques are often used to achieve reliable plant capacity [34]. 
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Figure 2.7: Maintenance strategy tree (adapted from [31]) 
RCM and TPM are typical maintenance strategies used to find the correct maintenance tasks, their 
frequency and sequence [10]. The failures are identified and the risk/consequence associated with each 
failure, where after maintenance techniques are then assigned accordingly. For instance,  
• when the potential consequences are low and it is difficult to maintain the item, allow the item 
to run-to-failure (RTF) [10]. 
• when the potential consequences are not acceptable, minimise them by using CBM, PM [10]. 
2.2.3.1 Reactive Maintenance 
Reactive Maintenance consists of Corrective Maintenance/Breakdown Maintenance and Run-to-
Failure. Figure 2.8 shows the process flow of a typical reactive maintenance task, which is triggered by 
an event. The majority of maintenance activities occur between the triggered event and the completed 
maintenance. As such, one of the goals of Reactive Maintenance is often, to reduce the response time 
and equipment downtime to a minimum [15]. 
 
Corrective Maintenance/
Breakdown Maintenance
Run-To-
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Figure 2.8: Reactive Maintenance model [15] 
2.2.3.1.1 Corrective Maintenance/Breakdown Maintenance 
Corrective Maintenance/Breakdown Maintenance (CM/BM) refers to all unplanned/unexpected 
maintenance tasks which are reactive to breakdowns or production interruptions. The main focus of 
these tasks is to return the equipment back to service as quickly as possible [35] with the perception that 
the effectiveness of this maintenance is determined by the functionality of the system, as long as the 
equipment continues to function at an acceptable level [35].  
 
This approach is however, ineffective and results in high maintenance cost with the two contributing 
factors being: 
1. Poor planning resulting from time constraints imposed by production and management 
while utilisation of manpower and maintenance resources are minimal [35].  
2. Incomplete repairs, which only focus on the symptoms of the failure but not the root cause, 
which can result in a recurring failure. 
CM/BM is an unplanned maintenance technique to restore the functionality of the system, thus, it is not 
formalised and not regarded as good engineering practise. 
2.2.3.1.2 Run-To-Failure 
With the Run-To-Failure (RTF) technique, the equipment is deliberately allowed to operate until it fails, 
thus, RTF can be regarded as planned (but unscheduled) maintenance. RTF should only be used under 
special conditions, when no other maintenance technique is suitable. Although RTF and CM/BM are 
both Reactive Maintenance techniques, the difference is that there is a clear plan in place for RTF, 
stipulating the use of spare parts, personnel and methods, therefore, minimising the impact on 
production. Similar to CM/BM, RTF is unpredictable, costly and requires a large number of spares that 
may be needed for breakdowns. 
2.2.3.2 Preventative Maintenance 
Preventative Maintenance (PM) is a series of planned maintenance activities, performed periodically. It 
aims to manage the PF interval (refer to Figure 2.5) by identifying potential failures (P) and performing 
maintenance best suited to the situation. PM is described by Chan and Shaw [23] as repair done on a 
system while it is in a “not failed” state. The main objectives of PM are to reduce a failure rate that 
increases because of age [23], prevent Reactive Maintenance, detect critical wear and therefore, extend 
the life of an asset [36][37]. PM has been used for many years to improve reliability and reduce 
maintenance costs, and can be seen as the opposite of Reactive Maintenance. Mobley [15] states that 
PM is limited to lubrication, adjustments and other time-driven maintenance tasks in most organisations, 
which are not true PM programs.  
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In contrast to the Reactive Maintenance, PM executes the plan before a failure occurs. Figure 2.9 shows 
how the planning of schedules and maintenance is done prior to a failure, and how the structured PM 
approach can achieve the AM objectives.   
 
Figure 2.9: Preventative Maintenance model [15] 
PM can be regarded as planned scheduled maintenance. The different techniques of PM will now be 
discussed briefly in the sections that follow. 
2.2.3.2.1 Predictive Maintenance 
Predictive Maintenance (PdM) consists of any maintenance action whereby the condition of a 
component is determined and the component replaced before it fails. The condition can be accessed 
through metrology (diagnostic measures such as temperature, pressure, vibration, speed) used by PdM 
to optimise total plant operation [38], inspections or statistical methods based on historical data. The 
latter will be the focus point of this study and will be discussed in detail in later sections of the current 
chapter. 
 
Metrology is playing a key role in PdM/CBM in various industries and will continue to do so with the 
advances in the hardware and software of information technology. At the same time, PdM continues to 
play a critical role with the selection of maintenance strategies and maintenance techniques. But not all 
components can be monitored with metrology, thus, other methods need to be used to supplement 
PdM/CBM. Typical examples where metrology cannot be used are the copper wiring of a high voltage 
DC motor, failure of repairable components due to poor workmanship, etc.   
 
In PM, all inspections are done periodically and are a combination of Time Directed Maintenance 
(TDM) and PdM [39]. The condition of the item is established, which can then be used to predict a 
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failure making use of PM techniques. Inspections should lead to the detection of failure or the expected 
onset of failure [39].  
2.2.3.2.2 Time Directed Maintenance 
Time Directed Maintenance (TDM) is any maintenance activity that takes place based on a measure of 
time. Appropriate action can be planned such as replacement, overhaul or repair, based on an item’s 
age, which can be measured in time, distance, number of cycles or any other measure. 
2.2.3.3 Design Out Maintenance 
Design Out Maintenance (DOM) is defined by the Asset Management Council [40] as a maintenance 
tactic whereby “changes or modifications are done to the equipment to remove a failure cause”. When 
maintenance alone cannot resolve a failure, whether the failure occurred once or more than once, DOM 
will be used to permanently solve the root cause of the failure. 
2.2.3.4 Reliability-Centered Maintenance  
Maintenance has evolved since the 1940’s from Corrective Maintenance (CM) to a strong focus on PM 
[32]. Pintelon and Gelders [18] refer to CM as pure “emergency” maintenance where equipment is only 
maintained when it is inoperable while they refer to PM as “loving care”. In the late 1960’s, a more 
integrated maintenance approach between reliability (R) and maintainability (M) was adopted. The term 
“R & M” also became popular and was followed by the concept of Reliability-Centered Maintenance 
(RCM) [32]. 
 
RCM is a specific implementation strategy of PM [27], defined by four features that characterise and 
set RCM apart from any other planning process, namely [27]: 
1. The most important objective of RCM is to preserve system function in line with the definition 
of reliability. This ensures that it will not be assumed that every component is equally important, 
but the context in which the component is related to the function of the system is taken into 
account. Therefore, in the first step, components which could have a detrimental effect on the 
functioning of the system must be identified. This can be done using various methods, or by 
conducting an analysis such as Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or Failure Mode 
and Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). 
2. The second step is to identify the specific failure modes in specific components, which can 
impair the functions of the system.  
3. The third step is to prioritise the importance of the failure modes in order to assign budgets and 
resources. This is done by interrogating each failure mode by means of a decision tree before 
categorising the failure modes which will then be used for developing the priority rationale. 
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4. The last step is to assign PM actions to each failure mode as prioritised in the previous step. 
Each potential PM action must be applicable and effective in restoring the functionality of the 
system [27].  
 
Fogul and Petersen [34] define “Reliability Based Maintenance” as a maintenance technique based on 
the traditional reactive, preventative and proactive maintenance techniques. It is however nothing else 
than RCM and they list seven breakthrough concepts advocated by RCM as follows: 
1. Analysis and prioritisation of system and failure modes of a plant in terms of their impact on 
capacity and availability. 
2. Where to invest maintenance resources, based on maintenance decisions. 
3. An optimal combination of preventative, predictive and proactive maintenance technologies. 
4. A renewed focus of the maintenance function. 
5. Using “breakthrough” practices to redefine the maintenance function, pursue productivity and 
capacity improvements. 
6. Understanding the impact of maintenance decisions throughout the plant. 
7. The use of key performance indicators for the maintenance function. 
 
Standards are available to assist with the application of RCM: 
• SAE JA1012  -  A Guide to the Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Standard. 
• SAE JA1011  -  Evaluation Criteria for RCM Processes. 
 
RCM is therefore a powerful strategy which can be used to develop suitable maintenance strategies for 
assets. 
2.2.3.5 Total Productive Maintenance 
Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) is a companywide equipment maintenance program involving 
everyone in the organisation in equipment improvement. Similar to RCM, TPM is an extension of a PM 
system that was formulated in the 1970’s in the manufacturing industry [32]. 
 
Instead of using only maintenance personnel, TPM combines concepts of continual improvement, total 
quality and employee involvement to achieve the following five goals [15][34]: 
1. To improve and optimise overall equipment effectiveness. 
2. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of maintenance.  
3. To eliminate equipment breakdowns.  
4. To involve the workforce in day-to-day maintenance activities. 
5. To continue training of personnel. 
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With TPM operators take responsibility and ownership of the equipment that they operate, without 
eliminating the use of maintenance staff. 
2.2.3.6 Risk Based Maintenance 
Risk Based Maintenance is an alternative maintenance strategy designed to minimise the risk as a result 
of failures or breakdowns. By using the Risk Based Maintenance strategy, the risk of possible failures 
are analysed based on the probability and consequence of the failure. The following four steps are 
followed [41]: 
1. Identify the scope. 
2. Perform risk assessment. 
3. Perform risk evaluation. 
4. Perform maintenance planning. 
 
American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practices (API RPs) are available to assist in the 
application of Risk Based Maintenance, such as API RP 580 and API RP 581. These are not standards 
and should only be used as guidelines. 
2.2.4 Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
In the first chapter, the contribution of RAMS was discussed. It must be noted that RAMS can be applied 
to any asset intensive industry but is well documented for the railway industry in BS EN 50126 [1].  
 
As part of RAMS, availability is considered to be one of the most important reliability performance 
measures of maintained systems [19] and quantifies the “usefulness” of an asset. Availability defines 
the item “in a state to perform the required function under given conditions…” [1][42]. Reliability and 
availability are often misinterpreted and in certain cases erroneously used interchangeably. Availability 
can be defined in terms of Mean Up Time (MUT) and Mean Down Time (MDT) in the following 
equation: 
 
MDTMUT
MUT
DowntimeUptime
Uptime
tyAvailabili
+
=
+
=
  
 [42] 
 
The importance of reliability and availability in the rail industry is best described by Milutinovic [42] 
who quantifies the influence of reliability on availability as:  
MUTMDT
MDTRSA
+
−=
**1 , where 
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S=distance covered in time period MUT 
R=number of failures in time period MUT 
 
Reliability can be grouped into the reliability of equipment and the reliability of people [43]. In BS EN 
50126 [1], the contribution of humans to railway RAMS is acknowledged and more rigorous control of 
the human factors is called for. Many studies have been done on the influence of human reliability on 
asset reliability (refer to Figure 2.10). Karanikas [43] concludes that human errors contribute to more 
than three quarters of failures during the life of an asset and states that “expecting to achieve perfection 
from an imperfect human is unrealistic”. Similarly, Vanderhaegen [44] describes the human behavioural 
degradation when performing tasks and system degradation due to human actions. Amadi-Echendu et 
al [4] recognise “human dimensions as a key issue in the management of engineering assets”. They find 
that human capital falls short in adapting to the sophisticated demands of modern AM and that the 
human factor might be the weak link in the AM chain. 
  
It is clear that all resources required for an effective AM system must be effectively managed. In section 
2.2 the contribution of human error towards imperfect, worse or worst maintenance was discussed, and 
it is therefore acknowledged that human error and human degradation contribute significantly to asset 
failure and asset reliability. However, none of the authors [4][24][43][44] could quantify the 
contribution of human error and therefore, in this study, the focus will be primarily on the reliability of 
assets, and the contribution of human error towards asset reliability will not be isolated or quantified.   
 
Figure 2.10: Elements of asset reliability [10] 
2.2.5 Reliability and Cost 
As stated, reliability is important but it should not be pursued at any cost. Ultimately, the cost of 
maintenance needs to be weighed against the total combined operation and downtime cost. Figure 2.11 
is a cash flow diagram where the cost of lost production is shown as a set of peaks and the aggregate 
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impact of lost time can be seen. This aggregate cost proves to be significant if compared to the cost of 
single breakdowns, and often, this is not considered during the optimising of reliability. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Typical cash flow diagram illustrating the cost of lost production [38] 
The cost of maintenance must be carefully planned over the complete asset life cycle. Even when the 
plant is “as new”, there will be maintenance cost associated with it when a PM strategy is properly 
executed. The cost of the PM strategy will rise steadily as the plant deteriorates with age, when the plant 
will start to require more attention to keep it running smoothly (Figure 2.12).  
 
Figure 2.12: Typical cost of a Preventative Maintenance strategy [38] 
 
Cost of routine PM 
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2.3 Modelling Reliability 
In the previous sections, the importance of reliability was shown and different maintenance techniques 
and strategies were discussed. PM was shown to be advantageous for many reasons, and that PdM is 
required in addition to PM to optimise cost and to ensure that assets are not “over-maintained”. CBM is 
an effective PdM technique in which metrology may play a critical role in view of future advances in 
information technology.  It was also highlighted that not all components can be measured with 
metrology and that the use of statistical models based on historical data, will become important in future 
to supplement the metrology based PdM. This section will describe Reliability Based Maintenance 
(RBM) and statistical based prediction models, which are shown in Figure 2.7 but were not discussed 
in the previous section. 
 
The use of statistical models based on historical data will become important in future to supplement the 
traditional maintenance techniques. By using a CMMS on a well-established and effective ERS, an 
effective maintenance system can be achieved. With statistical models, failures can be predicted and 
although not nearly as accurate as predictions from metrology, the statistical models can be used to fill 
the gaps in CBM. 
 
The rest of this chapter will focus on modelling and quantifying the reliability of physical assets based 
on historical data, and will discuss statistical techniques used for reliability. 
2.3.1 Reliability Systems, Theories and Definitions 
During the 1980s, there was a need for the standardisation of reliability terms and definitions, thus, the 
U.S. Department of Defence published a Military Standard (MIL-STD-721C [45]). This standard 
became a popular reference by authors, but Ascher and Feingold [29] do not agree with some of the 
definitions such as the definition for burn-in: 
• MIL-STD-721C [45]: “pre-conditioning, defined as the operation of an item under stress to 
stabilise its characteristics”. 
• Ascher and Feingold [29] : “the process which results in a decrease of the failure rate or 
probability of failure, with decreasing number of life units”. 
 
This indicates the need to read definitions in the contexts where they are published. For purposes of this 
study, definitions of reliability of systems will be used from Ascher and Feingold [29], summarised as 
follows: 
• Part: An item which is discarded after the first failure and cannot be disassembled. 
• Socket: An equipment position or circuit which, at any given time, holds a specific type of part. 
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• System: Two or more sockets with their associated parts which are interconnected to perform 
one or more functions.  
• Non repairable system: A system which is discarded after the first time it ceases to perform the 
function(s) satisfactorily [26][46]. 
• Repairable system: A system which, after failure to perform at least one of its required functions, 
can be restored to performing all of its required functions by any method, other than replacement 
of the entire system.  
 
A non-repairable system is modelled using the renewal theory which is based on the principle that a part 
is replaced after a failure, the condition restored to the good-as-new condition, and the failures are 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The renewal model is regarded as a “poor model” by 
Ascher and Feingold [29] since most repairs involve the replacement of only a small proportion of the 
parts after a failure. The renewal theory is not limited only to non-repairable systems because even if a 
system can physically be repaired (defined as a repairable system), it can still produce failure data that 
is i.i.d. and can therefore be classified as non-repairable [47].  
 
It might be possible that a repairable system can be restored without having to replace a part and 
possibly, repair the system by adjustment. Normally, a repairable system is not renewed to the good-as-
new condition, but minimally repaired to the bad-as-old condition by the repair or replacement of the 
failed component(s) [26]. If the failure data has a trend, the condition of the system can deteriorate (or 
improve) over time and must be modelled using regression techniques [26]. More about trend testing is 
discussed in later sections of this thesis. 
 
Calculating the reliability of a system requires the mathematical modelling of the system in terms of the 
interaction of various sub systems. When constant reliability values are used, a snapshot of system 
reliability is given at a specific time, and when time dependant reliability expressions are used, the 
system reliability can be observed over a period of time [19]. 
 
The uncertainty associated with reliability can be classified as aleatory or epistemic uncertainty. 
Epistemic uncertainty represents failures caused by a lack of knowledge of the system and can be 
represented by mathematical structures such as interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and 
probability theory [48]. Epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by better understanding of the system 
such as by experimental results or physical models. Aleatory uncertainty is related to randomness and 
is based on the mathematical structure of probability [48], which is the primary focus of this study.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
26 
 
2.3.2 Overview of System Reliability and RBDs 
For more comprehensive insights into the reliability of a system, it is important to be well versed in the 
configuration of the system. An understanding of the interaction between the system and its larger 
domain systems as well as its peer systems, sub-systems and components is also important. Bourouni 
[21] describes a number of reliability assessment techniques and compares the Reliability Block 
Diagram (RBD) to other reliability assessment techniques (Figure 2.13). He describes the RBD as the 
most logical and natural representation of a system showing how units (components or sub systems) are 
logically linked in series, parallel or combinations thereof.  
 
When units are linked in series, the failure of any unit results in system failure, and the reliability of a 
series system is the product of the individual reliabilities, represented by: 
  
∏
=
=
n
i
iRR
1
            (1) 
where n is the total number of units in the system and Ri the individual reliability units. 
 
Figure 2.13: Techniques for reliability and availability assessment [21] 
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Units linked in parallel allow for redundancy and the system remains operational even if only one unit 
is operational. The reliability of a pure parallel system can be calculated from the individual 
unreliabilities as shown below. 
 
∏
=
−=
n
i
iFR
1
1
           (2) 
where n is the total number of units in the system and Fi represents the individual unreliability of each 
unit defined as 1-Ri. 
 
Unlike a pure series system where the failure of a single unit results in system failure, or where a single 
unit needs to be operative in a parallel system, there are special variations where the system only operates 
when a certain number of units are operative in a certain sequence (k-out-of-n system) [20]. There are 
three variations of the k-out-of-n system, listed and described briefly below:  
 
1. In the series configuration, the consecutive k-out-of-n system only fails if more than k consecutive 
units have failed [19].  
2. In a balanced k-out-of-n system, the failure of one unit can force the shutdown of another unit when 
in a particular arrangement [19].  
3. In the general k-out-of-n system, redundancy can be built into parallel systems where the system is 
operational when at least k units out of a total n units are operational, and the reliability of the system 
can be calculated as follows:   
∏ ∏∑ ∏
=
+=
j
w
y
yj
l i
i RFRR
1
)]([
 [19]       (3) 
where l is the total number of possible combinations,  
i : items required to survive 
j : items allowed to fail 
w : total number of units in the system 
 
The general case of k-out-of-n systems is often adequate to model a system and the pure series and 
parallel systems are special cases of the general k-out-of-n system. When the system is operational when 
only one unit is operational, it can be denoted by the general 1-out-of-n system, which in turn is a pure 
parallel system. When the system is only operational when all the units are operational, it is a general 
case of n-out-of-n systems simplified by a series system.   
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2.3.3 Statistical Analysis of Failure Data for Repairable Systems  
Reliability is considered as the science of failures [21] and the purpose of the reliability engineer is to 
analyse trends in failure data, and determine the Rate of OCcurrence Of Failures (ROCOF) as accurately 
as possible. The ROCOF represents the number of failures per unit time, and a common erroneous 
approach used by reliability engineers is to use only the MTBF in calculating the ROCOF, ignoring the 
chronological order of failure events. The result thereof is that an assumption is indirectly made that 
failures occur randomly over the given period, and the opportunity to model failure trends is lost. This 
is illustrated in Figure 2.14, where three scenarios are shown with an equal MTBF, although the 
opportunity to model a “happy” or “sad” system is lost. 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Illustrating the risk of using only MTBF 
A practical framework for the analysis of failure data [29], modified by Coetzee [49] and Vlok [31], is 
shown in Figure 2.15. The framework suggests that before a failure distribution can be fitted, failure 
data should first be tested for a trend (Test 1 in Figure 2.15) and with no trend present, the dependency 
of failures should be determined (Test 2 in Figure 2.15). A test for dependence is applicable where a 
primary failure has a positive probability of triggering one or more subsidiary failures. An example is 
where a primary failure causes a secondary failure which is not detected until the system is put back into 
operation [29]. With no trend present in the failure data, the failure process can follow a renewal process 
where repair activities bring the condition of the system back to a “good as new” condition. Ascher and 
Feingold [29] and Vlok [31] find that the test for dependence (Test 2 in Figure 2.15) is most often 
omitted because: 
• A large number of failure observations are required to perform the test with reasonable 
confidence.  
• There are complexities involved in implementing and interpreting the test, relative to trend 
testing. 
• The lack of understanding of the need to perform this type of test. 
Therefore, with the absence of large number of failures and the uncertainty around the purpose of the 
dependence test, the test for dependence will also be omitted in this study.  
               1              2                3                    4                 5 
   
Failures occurring randomly 
               1  2     3          4                  5    
Failures with a definite decreasing trend, “happy” or ☺ system 
                        1                 2          3    4   5 
Failures with a definite increasing trend, “sad” or  system 
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Figure 2.15: Framework for the analysis of failure data, adapted [29,31,49] 
A short description will now follow on the methodology employed in the study, based on the framework 
in Figure 2.15. After a graphical assessment of the failure data is done to observe a failure trend, a 
numerical validation is done to confirm the result from the graphical assessment. Once a trend or no-
trend is confirmed, the most appropriate distribution must be selected, which will best describe the 
failure behaviour. The parameters for the selected failure distribution are then calculated and the level 
of confidence calculated to demonstrate how well the parameters fit the selected distribution. 
 
The methods for the above will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
2.3.3.1 Graphical Assessment of Failure Behaviour 
Ascher and Feingold [29] describe three graphical procedures which can be used to determine whether 
a system is deteriorating or improving. Not only will procedures be useful to understand the most 
important features of the failure data, but also helpful to check the initial assumptions after the 
distributions are fitted to the failure data. The three procedures described by Ascher and Feingold [29] 
are: 
1. Plotting cumulative failures versus cumulative time on linear paper. 
In this plot, the number of cumulative failures are plotted against the cumulative time (or usage). 
The graph is also known as the ROCOF plot [50]. If the ROCOF is constant, the plotted points 
will roughly be aligned, hence, the times between successive failures are identically distributed 
(marked “IID” in Figure 2.16). If the times between successive failures are decreasing, the curve 
presents a trend with larger increments in the number of failures per unit time. The tail end of 
this curve tends to concave up indicating reliability deterioration (marked “Deterioration” in 
Figure 2.16, also a “sad” system or ). Reliability growth is the opposite when the times 
between successive failures are increasing and the graph concaves down with smaller 
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increments in the number of failures per unit time (marked “Growth” in Figure 2.16, also a 
“happy” system or ☺).   
 
Figure 2.16: Graphical assessment of trends in failure data [50] 
2. Estimating average ROCOF in successive time periods. 
Ascher and Feingold [29] observe that local variations in the failure rate will be masked because 
of the monotonically increasing nature of the cumulative number of failures plot. An alternative 
is to divide the observation period into a number of equal subintervals and plot the average 
ROCOF for each subinterval, calculated as: 
titti
t
tNtN
tv iii ∆<<∆−∆
−
=
− )1(,)()()( 1
 
where Nj(t) is the total number of observed failures from t=0 to t=tj.  
 
When a system is deteriorating, vi(t) with i=1,2,… will tend to increase because more failures 
occur within a subinterval. The same applies for a system that is improving, where vi(t), i=1,2,… 
will tend to decrease. A disadvantage of this procedure, identified by Ascher and Feingold [29], 
is that the selection of different subinterval lengths will result in different conclusions. The 
selection of one subinterval length only will not give the best results necessarily, thus, different 
selections should be tested and compared. 
3. Duane plots. 
In 1964, Duane [51] introduced a learning curve approach to reliability monitoring. The model 
was developed for the aircraft industry, where he found that electromechanical and mechanical 
systems follow simple and predictable failure patterns. Duane [51] plotted the cumulative 
☺ 
 
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failure rate (which is defined as the total number of failures since the program was first used) 
divided by the total operating hours since first use, on log-log scales and found consistent 
straight line plots.  
 
In order to summarise graphical failure trends, typical trends will be discussed. Gilbert [52] identifies 
eight types of trends applied in environmental pollution, which are applicable to any industry (refer to 
Figure 2.17 for detail). The trend types are listed as follows: 
1. Random trend, which is a sequence of measurements where the fluctuations along the sequence 
are due to unassigned and random causes. 
2. Cycle and random, with no long term trend. 
3. Trend and random, which refers to random fluctuations with a growing linear trend. 
4. Trend and cycle and random, which consist of random fluctuations within a cycle with a 
growing linear trend. 
5. Trend and non-random, where a growing trend is present with non-random causes. 
6. Random with impulse, which refers to a random trend with a short lived impulse. 
7. Step change plus random, which is similar to the “random with impulse”, but with a more 
permanent step change. 
8. Random followed by trend, which is a sequence of random measurements fluctuating about a 
constant level with a growing trend.  
 
Although it is suggested by Gilbert [52] that the eight trend types are applicable to any industry, which 
can be used to categorise the performance of an asset, it does not add value to the understanding of 
reliability growth or reliability deterioration. These trends can be identified in failure data, although it 
will not add value to the interpretation of how the system performed. 
 
Therefore, this study will be limited to the three graphical techniques suggested by Ascher and Feingold 
[29] to determine whether a system is deteriorating or improving.  
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Figure 2.17: Eight types of failure trends [52] 
2.3.3.2 Numerical Trend Tests 
In the previous section, the graphical assessment of the trend in failure data was discussed. As discussed 
earlier, the purpose of the graphical assessment of the failure data is to observe a failure trend, but a 
numerical validation is still required to confirm whether the results from the graphical assessment are 
correct. Although there are many techniques for calculating trends, the focus in this  study will only be 
on three trend tests, which are discussed below. 
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2.3.3.2.1 Basic Notations 
Before discussing the detail of trend testing, there are some important notations and definitions that need 
to be clarified. Firstly, in a system, events are recorded on a continuous global time t, and numbered 
from event 1 up to r, where r is the total number of events. The arrival times (also called times to events) 
T1,T2,…Tr is defined as the times when the events occur, measured in global time, where T1 denotes the 
first event, T2 the second event, and so on. Similarly X1,X2,…Xr is the inter-arrival times (also called 
times between events), measured in local time, where Tn=X1+X2+….+Xn and Xn=Tn-Tn-1. These concepts 
are illustrated in Figure 2.18. 
                
 
Figure 2.18: Arrival times Tn and inter-arrival times Xn 
Secondly, an integer counting process N(t) is defined as the number of events which occurred in (0,t], 
which will include both the number of failures, N(t), and the instances of occurrence, T1,T2,…[31].  
 
Lastly, during PM, components are repaired or replaced even when not all these components have failed. 
For failure analysis, this is regarded as truncated failure time observations (also called suspensions) 
because the component survived up to the age of PM but it is not known when the component would 
have failed if left undisturbed [31]. A variable Ci is recorded with each Xi indicating whether Xi was a 
truncated failure observation (Ci=0) or a “real” failure (Ci=1) and this will influence the approach when 
manipulating the data. 
2.3.3.2.2 Laplace Trend Test 
The Laplace Trend Test (LTT) [26] [29] is the most extensively used trend test for data sets [31], and 
was therefore chosen for this purpose in this study. The test is effective for calculating a trend where all 
the events are real failures. The trend parameter UL can be calculated by: 
 
         (4) 
where T1,T2,…,Tr = arrival times of failures,  
r = total number of observations [26][31] 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) for the LTT is that the distribution of the arrival times corresponds to a 
Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) if the rejection criteria is met [53], otherwise the Non 
Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) is followed. A HPP is a stochastic time based process, where 
the inter-arrival times are i.i.d. The rejection criteria is based on a standard normal distribution 
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assumption, and it will reject H0 if UL >zα/2  or UL <-zα/2 [53]. Based on a typical 95% confidence level 
(α=5%), H0 will be rejected if UL>1.96 or UL<-1.96, and if UL=0 it means that the trend is a horizontal 
line. For simplicity, the rejection criteria is approximated as UL>2 or UL<-2. Ascher and Feingold [29] 
find that the test is effective for r≥4. 
 
Coetzee [26] interprets the value of the LTT value UL in Table 2.2, and from the results the type of 
theory can be selected. Once the renewable theory or repairable system theory is selected, a family of 
distributions can be selected and the parameters determined with the most appropriate method.  
 
Table 2.2: Interpretation of the LTT value UL [26] 
Value of u Description Type of theory 
-2< UL<-1,  
1< UL <2 
Grey area, more tests required Either renewal theory or 
repairable systems theory 
UL <-2 Reliability improvement, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory, use 
NHPP 
UL >2 Reliability degradation, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory, use 
NHPP 
-1< UL <1 Non-committal, data 
homogeneous 
Renewable theory, use HPP 
 
A shortcoming identified by the author in the LTT is that the test does not account for the discrepancy 
when the last failure is not near the end of the observation period. Consider the hypothetical case in 
Figure 2.19 where X1=X2=X3=X4=100 days, and X5=1000 days. The following LTT values for UL can 
be calculated: 
• 866.0)( 41 =→ TTU L , which indicates the data is non-committal and homogeneous. 
• 217.1)( 51 −=→ TTUL , which is in a grey area and indicates that the data follows either the 
renewal theory or repairable systems theory. 
 
It is therefore important that the LTT calculation should not be done blindly, without questioning the 
data and the results. The author compensated for this by selectively adding a failure point at the end 
and/or at the beginning of the observation period. Therefore, some components can have one or more 
truncated failure observations (also called suspensions), where the last failure data points of the data set 
are not failures, but merely the beginning or end of the observation period. 
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Figure 2.19: Illustrating the shortcoming in the LTT 
When the LTT UL value is within the grey area (-2< UL <-1, 1< UL <2), further tests can be performed 
such as the Lewis-Robinson test [53], Mann-Kendall test [54], Weibull test, Carroll-Hung method [55] 
to determine whether the data has a trend. The Lewis-Robinson test and Mann-Kendall test will be 
discussed further. 
2.3.3.2.3 Lewis-Robinson Trend Test 
According to Coit [53], there is a danger of drawing the wrong conclusions when the H0 of the LTT is 
rejected. The Lewis-Robinson (L-R) test is a modification of the LTT where the H0 is the distribution 
of the arrival times corresponds to a Renewal Process (RP). The L-R statistics (ULR) can be defined in 
terms of the LTT value UL and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the inter-arrival times as: 
CV
UU LLR =            (5) 
CV can be calculated as  
X
XVarXCV ][][ =
 
Where ][XVar  is the standard deviation of the inter-arrival times, and X  the mean of the inter-
arrival times. 
 
Like in the case of the LTT, H0 will be rejected if ULR >zα/2 or ULR <-zα/2 [53] 
2.3.3.2.4 Mann-Kendall Trend Test 
The last trend test that will be discussed is the Mann-Kendall (MK) test. The MK test statistic is defined 
in terms of the consecutive inter-arrival times. It is based on a test statistic S, calculated as follows [56]: 
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The test is based on a S statistic and a MK probability value. As indicated, the S statistic is the sum of 
the differences between sequential inter-arrival events calculated for the full population of events. The 
		0									T1									T2								T3								T4																																															T5	 			t 
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MK value is obtained from the MK probabilities (Table 6.2 in Appendix B), where the sign of the S 
value is ignored when used in the table.  
 
The MK H0 assumes that the data set is independently distributed with no trend against the alternative 
hypothesis HA of an upward trend. H0 will be rejected in favour of HA if the MK value is less than a 
significance level α. To test H0 against HA of a downward trend, accept HA and reject H0  if S is negative 
and if MK is less than α.  
2.3.3.3 Parameter Estimation 
The estimation of the parameters from failure data can be done using techniques such as the Least 
Squares Estimation (LSE), Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and Newton-Rapson algorithm. 
Only the LSE technique will be discussed further.  
2.3.3.3.1 Least Squares Estimation Method 
The LSE is a method where the sum of the squared errors is minimised. Consider the errors in Figure 
2.20, where the parameters of a line (for example, the parameters m and c in the equation y=mx+c) need 
to be determined so that the sum of the squared errors (e12+ e22+e32+e42) is as small as possible. For the 
NHPP, the LSE value was calculated from the observed number of failures and the calculated number 
of failures (N(t)).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.20: Illustrating the errors for LSE 
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2.3.3.3.2 Linear Regression Method 
For the estimation of the two parameter Weibull distribution, linear regression can be done. In order to 
perform linear regression, the Weibull cumulative distribution (F(x)) must be rewritten into a linear 
format, i.e. y=mx+c as follows:  
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Where )))(1
1ln(ln(
xF−
 corresponds to Y, xln  corresponds to X, β  corresponds to m, and ηβ ln  
corresponds to c.  
Also, in preparation for linear regression, the plotting position of the F(x) value must be calculated. 
There are many plotting position formulas such as Gringorten, Cunnane, Kimball and Blom, as 
summarised by Kim [57]. The median rank plotting position method, similar to that of Cunnane is used 
for the Weibull linear regression, where: 
4.0
3.0)(0 +
−
=
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Finally, a linear regression calculation can then be used to determine the parameters where η can be 
obtained from the regression results, which is the slope of the line, and 
)( βη
c
e
−
= . 
2.3.3.4 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Goodness-of-Fit Test 
The purpose of a goodness-of-fit test is to determine the confidence bands of a distribution function. 
Although there are many goodness-of-fit techniques, Gilbert [52] observes that the non-parametric 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is more powerful than other tests. This KS test will be the focus of 
this section. Many other tests are modifications of the KS test such as the Anderson-Darling test, 
Cramér-von-Mises test and the Lilliefors test [58]. 
 
The purpose of the test is to check whether an observed cumulative step-function of a population Sn(x) 
fits a hypothetical cumulative distribution function F0(x). Massey [59] explains the test procedure by 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
38 
 
drawing the F0(x) on a graph, and then draws a confidence curve above and below the F0(x) (see Figure 
2.21). The confidence curves are calculated as follows: 
• The curve above = F0(x)+d 
• The curve below = F0(x)-d 
where d is obtained from the KS-table (Table 6.3 in Appendix B), based on the confidence level α. It is 
shown as: 
)()()()()( 00 NdxFxSNdxF n αα +<<−
       (7) 
The observed cumulative step function Sn(x) is then plotted and when Sn(x) passes outside any 
confidence band, the hypothesis (that of F0(x) taken to be the true distribution at the α level of 
significance) will be rejected.  
 
 
Figure 2.21: Graphical method of applying the KS test [59] 
Alternatively, the KS test statistic can be used, defined as: 
)()(sup 0 xFxSRxD nn −∈=  [58]. 
The Dn value is then used in the KS-table (Table 6.3 in Appendix B) to obtain a d value.  
2.3.4 Non-Repairable Systems 
The definition of a non-repairable system is given previously as “a system which is discarded after the 
first time it ceases to perform the function(s) satisfactorily [26][46]”. The failure data for a non-
repairable system is i.i.d. based on the trend tests, and failures in the data set can be assumed to come 
from the same statistical distribution, independent from one another. The data is homogeneous, which 
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means that the order in which the events occurred is not important and the failure data can be represented 
by various standard distributions [29]. 
 
There are a number of distributions which can be used to model homogenous failure data and the 
Weibull distribution (refer to Table 2.3) is one of the most commonly used and flexible lifetime 
distributions [60]. Substantial research has been done on more applications of the Weibull distribution 
such as by Unkle and Venkataraman [61] who found synergy between the Weibull and the Army 
Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) models. Xie and Lie [62] developed an additive Weibull 
distribution to represent the bathtub-shaped failure rate data with a single distribution, that is related to 
the exponential and Weibull distributions. For the same purpose they developed the new Weibull 
distribution, and when the shape parameter (β) <1, the lifetime data has a bathtub shaped hazard rate 
function.  
 
There are four functions associated with the failure analysis of non-repairable systems (f(x), F(x), R(x) 
and z(x)), which are: 
Failure density (f(x)):  Also called the probability density function, which provides the probability of 
failure at instant x [26]. 
Cumulative Failure Distribution F(x): The probability of failure before or at a certain age. When f(x) is 
integrated with respect to x, the probability of system failure before a certain 
instant is obtained [31], with 0≤F(x)≤1. 
Survival Function R(x):  The probability that a component will survive up to a point in time where R(x) 
= 1 – F(x), 0≤R(x)≤1. 
Hazard Function z(x):   Also called the conditional intensity/failure intensity/Force of Mortality 
(FOM). It gives the probability that a component will fail at a certain life, 
where z(x) = f(x)/R(x). 
 
The mathematical connection between these functions are shown in Table 2.3 and they can all be used 
in the modelling of failures of non-repairable systems. The functions are shown in Table 2.3, applied 
for the exponential distribution and two parameter Weibull distribution.  
 
The exponential distribution, that assumes a constant failure rate, is a special case of the Weibull 
distribution with β=1 and λ=1/η. In the two parameter Weibull distribution, the shape parameter β and 
characteristic life η parameters can provide valuable information regarding the component in question. 
As already discussed in a previous section, the parameters can be determined using various techniques.  
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Table 2.3: The relation of f(x), F(x), R(x), z(x) [26], exponential and Weibull distributions [19][26] 
Expressed by F(t) f(t) R(t) z(t) 
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The mean life of the Weibull distribution is [19]: 






+Γ=−− βη
11.)]([ failuretotimeTE
        (8) 
where Γ(n) is the gamma function and the values for n are obtained from the Gamma Table 6.4 in 
Appendix B.  
 
For a non-repairable system, the trend tests already confirmed that the life data is independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). For the Weibull distribution, the shape parameter (β) can provide an 
indication whether the hazard rate is increasing (β>1) or decreasing (β<1). If the shape parameter equals 
unity (β=1), the intensity function (z(x)) remains constant, the system has a constant FOM therefore the 
instantaneous risk of failure remains constant throughout the life of the system (as the case of the 
exponential distribution). The η is the characteristic life, which is an indication of the expected life and 
also an indication of the age at which 63.2% of the components will fail [26].   
 
In the case of perfect maintenance which restores the condition of the system to the “good as new” 
condition, the failure process is called a renewal process. Times between failures are i.i.d. and a special 
case is the HPP Repairable systems. A repairable system can be restored to perform the intended 
function without the complete replacement of the system. It is often modelled as a counting failure 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
41 
 
process and the analysis of repairable systems must consider the effects of successive repair actions 
[53].  
2.3.5 Repairable Systems 
The definition of a repairable system was discussed earlier as “a system which, after failure to perform 
at least one of its required functions, can be restored to performing all of its required functions by any 
method, other than replacement of the entire system.” 
 
Repairable systems are represented by non-homogenous data and can best be modelled by the NHPP 
[26][31][49]. The NHPP is generally suitable for the purpose of modelling data with a trend, relatively 
easy to use and have been tested fairly well [49]. The major difference between the NHPP and HPP is 
that the rate of occurrence with NHPP varies with time rather than being constant. For the remainder of 
this document, when reference is made to the ROCOF for NHPP, a time variant ROCOF is implied, 
which can be denoted ρ(t). This is in contrast with the constant ROCOF ρ for the HPP.   
 
Two formats of the NHPP found in literature is the log-linear NHPP, represented by  
t
et 10)(1 ααρ += , with 0,, 10 ≥∞<<∞− tαα  [26][31]      (9) 
and the power law NHPP, represented by  
1
2 )( −= βλβρ tt , where 0,0, ≥> tβλ .  [26][31]      (10) 
NHPP repairable systems are best modelled with α1>0 (log-linear NHPP) and β>1 (power law NHPP), 
and a linearly increasing failure rate is obtained when β=2 (power law NHPP) [26]. System reliability, 
the expected number of failures and MTBF can be calculated from the NHPP models as shown in Table 
2.4. 
Table 2.4: NHPP equations for repairable systems for the interval (T1,T2) [26][31][49] 
 Log-linear NHPP 
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A practical framework for the analysis of failure data was discussed earlier, which suggests that failure 
data be tested for trends before a failure distribution can be fitted. With a trend present, the repairable 
systems approach should be followed, but it is important to understand that with no trend present, even 
repairable systems should follow the non-repairable approach.  
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Based on the literature on the statistical approach to failure analysis, the framework for the analysis of 
failure data can be adapted to include the methods explained in this chapter, and is shown in Figure 2.22. 
 
 
Figure 2.22: Summary framework for the analysis of failure data  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
43 
 
3 APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY BASED MAINTENANCE 
MODEL 
In the second chapter, the literature associated with the reliability of engineering assets was discussed. 
The application of the Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) model is discussed in this chapter by 
means of a case study, applied to rolling stock at Metrorail. This chapter consists of four parts. The first 
part is a discussion of the methodology, followed by a discussion of reliability in the rail context, a 
sketch of the current maintenance situation at Metrorail while in the last part, the RBM model is applied 
at Metrorail. 
3.1 Methodology for Modelling Reliability 
The methodology for the Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) model is presented, as summarised in 
Error! Reference source not found.. It consists of six steps starting with the literature review, and each 
step is discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Methodology for the Reliability Based Maintenance model for quantifying reliability 
Step 1: Literature Review 
The first step is to understand the theory of reliability, the importance of measuring reliability and 
different techniques used in the quantification of reliability. The contribution of reliability in the AM 
context is defined, and the contribution of maintenance towards reliability is understood as well as the 
cost associated with reliability. Using statistics to model the reliability of a system is explained and 
graphical and numerical techniques investigated to explore trends in failure behaviour. Repairable and 
non-repairable systems are defined and the associated failure distributions discussed. The contribution 
of both components and sub-systems towards the reliability of sub-systems and systems respectively, 
are explained using RBDs, and redundancy. 
 
Step 2: Reliability Model 
The next step is to study the equipment and understand the interaction of the different systems. Critical 
or high risk components can be identified by performing a qualitative risk analysis on the main 
components of the different systems. A RBD model can then be constructed for these components 
showing their interaction. Care must be taken to balance the type of components in sub-systems, which 
will ensure that the reliability of sub-systems will not dominate the overall reliability of the system. 
Literature 
Review 
Reliability 
Model 
Data 
Collection 
Quantify 
Reliability 
Analyse 
Results 
Validation of 
Model 
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Redundancy must be taken into account and the number and sequence of operational components must 
be built into the RBD model. 
 
Step 3: Data Collection 
Once the RBD model is completed, failure data can be collected for the components. In this study the 
assumption was made that the replacement of components controls the condition of the system, ignoring 
any maintenance that is done in between the replacements. In addition, care must be taken in the 
interpretation of data in order to address the issue of truncated failure observations. In the case study, it 
was observed that data from the CMMS was not complete, and artificial “failures” were added at the 
beginning and/or the end of the observation period to make the failure pattern more realistic, as 
explained in Figure 2.19. 
 
Step 4: Quantify Reliability 
Here, the data is sorted and prepared for analysis. For each component in the RBD, the following four 
steps must be performed: 1) determine whether a trend is present using graphical and/or numerical 
methods, 2) determine the most appropriate failure behaviour, 3) calculate the parameters for the 
distribution, and 4) determine the goodness-of-fit for the parameters. Although there are many 
techniques which can be used during these four steps, only some techniques will be explained and used 
during the case study. 
 
System reliability is then calculated using the failure behaviours of the different components simulated 
in the RBD model over time. All the data manipulation can be done in Data Microsoft® Excel, as proved 
in the case study 
 
Step 5: Validation of model 
The RBD model is validated using real data from Metrorail. For the purpose of the research and in order 
to prove the effectiveness of the model, three MCs with the most number of component failures are 
selected to validate the model. A train set is built using these three MCs and various failure behaviours 
tested. 
 
Step 6: Analyse Results 
The system reliability can then be analysed using different scenarios. By using the equations for the 
failure distributions, various calculations can be done like the prediction of failures, the calculation of 
MTBF or MTTF, the calculation of Reliability, residual life, cost optimisation and the effect of 
maintenance on reliability.  
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3.2 Reliability in the Rail Context 
Many studies have been done on railway reliability and the effect thereof. These include studies on the 
relationship between reliability and productivity in railroad services [63], the importance of railway 
reliability to convince drivers of passenger vehicles to switch to public transport [64], the effect of 
unreliability on travel time [65], overcrowding because of delays and the effect thereof on productivity 
and efficiency of workers [66], and the effect of reliability on the availability of the service [42]. These 
studies clearly show that reliability is important to railroad companies and that the consequence of 
unreliability cannot be ignored. 
 
Railway reliability can be measured in different ways among them the punctuality of the service [63], 
cancellations and delays [2] as well as the number of realised connections between trains [2]. From a 
passenger’s perspective, the punctuality of the service is often used as a reliability measure, which is 
defined as the probability that the train will arrive at the final destination within a certain margin of the 
scheduled arrival time. Most of these reliability measures are lagging indicators and cannot be related 
to the source of the unreliability. The rail operator needs to carefully balance these measures because if 
one of them is overemphasised, the other measures might suffer and the commuter will be affected.  
 
The average punctuality of some major European metro railroad operators is around 95% [67] where 
trains arrive at the final destination within the international margin of five minutes, although some 
operators use a three minute margin and still manage a punctuality of around 95%. In South Africa, the 
punctuality of the Metrorail railway system was 84% in 2011 [67] based on five minutes, which has 
room for improvement compared to international benchmarks.  
 
In the literature review, various definitions of reliability were discussed. In the general definition of 
reliability, “the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a specific interval under 
stated conditions” [1], the function of rolling stock in the passenger rail context is to transport people to 
their destination on time, or simply mission success. From the rolling stock point of view, a successful 
mission can be defined as a train run completed without a failure of the asset. 
 
It is clear that most reliability measures are based on the performance of the rail service and are lagging 
indicators, showing how well the assets were managed but which cannot be related to the source of the 
unreliability. A leading reliability measure is required, which must be forward looking and must assist 
with the performance management of the asset [43]. 
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3.3 Current Reliability Strategy at Metrorail  
In this section, the current maintenance strategy is discussed. The section starts with a short background 
of Metrorail followed by the current train set configuration and maintenance strategy at Metrorail. 
3.3.1 Background of Metrorail 
Metrorail is owned by PRASA and operates urban passenger trains in the four major metropolitans in 
South Africa [68]. With more than 270 train sets running over 2228km of track, Metrorail transport an 
estimated 1.7million paying passengers per weekday [69]. Metrorail operates an aging fleet of trains, 
some in operation since 1958. Metrorail predominantly uses cancellations and delays as a reliability 
measure for their fleet [67].  
 
The first passenger coach arrived in South Africa in 1860, marking the start of passenger rail transport 
in the country. The first electric train was called the 2M and was commissioned in 1937 in Johannesburg. 
Since then, trains were constantly upgraded and every upgrade was given the next numerical number 
e.g. 3M, then 4M. Today, the fleet of 270 train sets consist predominantly of the 5M type (refer Figure 
3.2, commissioned from 1959) as well the 8M, 10M2 and 10M3 types. The missing numbers (6M, 7M 
and 9M) were prototype trains and are not in use any more. Trains are maintained by Metrorail on a 
fortnightly basis while upgrades of trains are done every seven years by private companies. 
 
Currently, PRASA is busy with modernisation programmes whereby 600 train sets will be procured and 
maintenance depots, infrastructure as well as stations will be upgraded. The introduction of new 
technology train sets is exciting but also challenging because the old rolling stock must still be operated, 
maintained and upgraded for another 15 years before it will be withdrawn from service. It is, therefore, 
important that the old fleet still be maintained to a high standard to maintain reliability and availability 
in order to minimise cancellations and delays. 
3.3.2 Train Set Configuration 
Metrorail defines a Motor Coach (MC) (Figure 3.2) as a powered rail vehicle able to transport passengers 
and to pull unpowered Passenger Trailers (PTs). A typical Metrorail train set consists of nine PTs and 
three MCs (one in the middle and one at each end). The contribution of PTs towards the reliability of a 
train set is insignificant compared to the contribution of the MCs. Thus, for the purpose of this study, 
the train set is represented by the three MCs only.  
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Figure 3.2: Typical 5M series MC 
Three MCs are required for nine PTs to provide both enough tractive effort as well as system redundancy 
in the train set. Each MC is identical and the three MCs on a train set are inter-connected, whereby 
certain systems are connected in parallel creating spare capacity (called reducdancy). The compressed 
air system is one such system where the compressors on the three MCs are connected to the same piping 
system and air tanks, thereby compensating for the pressure drop over the length of the train set and 
allowing the pressure to build up faster. If one compressor fails, the train set will still be able to complete 
the mission normally and the compressor can be replaced at the next maintenance interval. If more than 
one compressor fail, then the train set will not be able to function normally and Breakdown Maintenance 
is required. The same applies for the vacuum system and 110V power supply system, where minimum 
two out of the three vacuum pumps (also called vacuum exhausters) and minimum two out of the three 
supply sets must be functional for the train set to be operational. 
3.3.3 Current Maintenance Strategy of Metrorail 
Metrorail maintains their own rolling stock fleet making use of CBM during planned intervals. During 
the late 1990’s, a two week maintenance interval was adopted by Metrorail based on the average distance 
travelled per train set. This two week interval is still in use today and not adapted or changed according 
to the operational requirements. A train set is, therefore, scheduled for maintenance every two weeks, 
and the focus and intensity of maintenance will differ during each maintenance intervention. The 
question is whether the two week maintenance cycle results in over maintaining of the train sets thereby 
wasting valuable resources. 
 
In Metrorail, there are three types of scheduled maintenance interventions (referred to as ‘sheds’). A 
typical eight week maintenance cycle of any train set is summarised in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Three types of maintenance activities, spread over an eight week cycle at PRASA 
Week 
number 
Shed 
name 
Description PRASA reference document 
Week 0    
Week 2 A-Shed Passenger Safety and 
Comfort (PS&C) 
DOCS_MHQ-#71498-V5-A_SHED_-
_ELECTRICAL_FITTER_CHECK_SHEET 
Week 4 B-Shed Intermediate Shed DOCS_MHQ-#87635-V1-B_SHED_-
_ELECTRICAL_FITTER_CHECK_SHEET 
Week 6 A-Shed PS&C Shed  
Week 8 C-Shed Full Shed DOCS_MHQ-#71514-V3-C_SHED_-
_ELECTRICAL_FITTER_CHECK_SHEET 
 
The Railway Safety Regulator (RSR), who is the custodian of railway safety in South Africa, requires 
that passenger and safety inspections are done regularly on each train set, which is two weeks in the 
case of Metrorail. During the A-Shed, the main focus is the safety and comfort of the passengers, 
focussing on the functionality of components such as the braking system, wipers, doors, horn, etc. The 
majority of the maintenance activities do not add value to the reliability of the train set, hence the name 
safety and comfort.  
 
During a B- and C-Shed, CBM is applied to various components over and above the activities from the 
A-Shed. For CBM to be effective, components are classified in terms of condition. A condition of five 
indicated a new component, a condition of two means that the component must be replaced at the next 
maintenance intervention, and a condition of one means that the train set must be removed from service 
and the component replaced immediately. CBM is applied to components such as [3]: 
• Traction motors 
• Compressors 
• 110V Supply sets 
• Exhausters 
• Static invertors 
• Pantographs 
• Wheels 
 
The condition of these components are categorised during CBM and captured on checklists and on the 
Facility Maintenance Management System (FMMS), which is then used to plan TdM interventions 
based on the conditions equal to two. Unfortunately, the criteria used for the classification of these 
components are not clear and not conclusive to make a confident classification, which leads to 
questioning of CBM effectiveness.  
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3.4 Reliability Based Maintenance Model Applied to Metrorail 
In this section, the application of the RBM model is explained. It describes where the data was obtained 
from and how the failure data was manipulated and interpreted in terms of system reliability. 
3.4.1 Collection of Data 
In order to effectively quantify the reliability of rail rolling stock, the contribution of component failures 
to cancellations and delays was investigated and the critical components identified. Failure data, which 
was obtained from the FMMS, was analysed and the three most critical MCs were identified for further 
calculations.  
3.4.1.1 Identification of Critical Components 
In a study done by the author (refer to Appendix F), the contribution of different components in a MC 
towards cancellations and delays were investigated. The components can be classified in different 
groups, which can be seen in the first column of Table 3.2. The grouping was done by Metrorail many 
years ago to make the analysis of the contribution of components towards cancellations and delays 
easier. 
 
It is clear that group E is a significant contributor to cancellations and delays, and that the Time per 
delay and Time per event in columns II and III are less than the other groups. Time per delay refers to 
the average time of train delays while Time per event refers to the time it took to close the fault. After 
further investigation, it can be reported that group E consists of all electronic components like electronic 
boards, circuit breakers, master controller, instruments, lights, etc. Many faults on these components 
can be repaired by either resetting the system, or the quick replacement or repair of the component. The 
electronic components from this group are integrated into the other groups, and failure of many 
electronic components have an influence on system functionality. Unfortunately accurate failure data 
are not recorded for this group and therefore this group, although important for functionality, will not 
be considered for the simplified reliability model in this research. 
 
Group M (Traction and Auxiliary machines and controls) was used in this study as this group contributes 
14% to delays and 13% to cancellations. This group is significant compared to the other groups and 
plays a major role in the reliability of the rolling stock fleet.  
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Table 3.2: Contribution of component groups to cancellations and delays [67] 
Group Group description Contribution 
to delays 
Time per 
delay 
Time per 
event 
Contribution to 
Cancellations 
  Column I Column II Column III Column IV 
E Electronic Control Equipment 47% 18.0 min 44.3min 31% 
P High Voltage and 
switch equipment 23% 18.4 min 50.4 min 30% 
M 
Traction/Auxiliary 
machine and 
controls 
14% 19.3 min 52.2 min 13% 
O Brake gear 2% 17.5 min 29.7 min 5% 
B Cab and Saloon doors 6% 21.1 min 46.5 min 6% 
A Air related 4% 18.1 min 58.6 min 4% 
G Pantograph 3% 18.9 min 54.0 min 7% 
 Other components  1% 13.9 min 20.5 min 4% 
 
 
 18 min ave 46 min ave  
 
The focus of this study is on the position of the components in a MC, earlier defined as a socket [31], 
which is “a space that at any given time, holds a part of a given type” [29]. The major components in 
group M are repairable components, thus, when any these components fail in a MC, it will be removed 
and sent to the repair shop while another will be drawn from stock and fitted.  
 
The risks of the major components in group M were determined using a qualitative risk analysis. In 
order to demonstrate the analysis, a probability-consequence analysis was done on the major 
components in group M using values obtained from experts at Metrorail. The probability and 
consequence of the four major components in this group are shown in Figure 3.3 together with other 
components of a MC for comparison. The four major components in group M are (abbreviations shown 
in brackets): 
1. Traction motor (TM).  
2. Compressor (COMP).  
3. 110V Supply set (SUPPLY).  
4. Vacuum Exhauster (EXH). 
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Figure 3.3: Qualitative risk analysis for selecting critical components 
The probability of failure (Pf) of the TM is higher than that of the other components (Figure 3.3), but 
the consequence of failure (Cf) of a TM is lower than a supply set, compressor and vacuum exhauster. 
The Cf of a TM is less than the other components because there are four TMs on a MC working in a 
specific configuration. This will be illustrated in section 3.4.3.1, where the RBDs are shown. 
 
Parallels between these four components are that: 
• each component is the main component of a sub-system, i.e.  
o the compressor, which includes an electrical motor and pump, generates compressed 
air for the air system. 
o the traction motor is the most critical component in the propulsion system. 
o the vacuum exhauster, which includes an electrical motor and vacuum pump, is the 
main component in the vacuum system.  
o the supply set, which includes an electric motor and alternator, is the main component 
in the 110V supply system. 
• the components are driven by an electric motor or are electric motor itself. 
• these four components combined contribute 14% to delays and 13% to cancellations of rolling 
stock at Metrorail [67].   
• these components are serialised, repaired by Metrorail and failure data is available.  
3.4.1.2 Identification of Critical MCs 
For the purpose of this study, three MCs were selected with the worst failure data during the observation 
period, which will be used for the duration of this study. Ten MCs with the most number of failures 
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were identified and the number of failures for each component are listed in Table 3.3. The contribution 
of each component to reliability was taken from Figure 3.3 (Cf) and is indicated in the row marked 
Weight in Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: Selecting the three worst Motor Coaches using weighted average method 
 
 
Number of Replacements 
Weighted 
Priority 
MC 
reference SUPPLY EXH TM COMP 
Weight 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 
Co
ac
h 
nu
m
be
r 
17673 4 6 23 6 26.6 MC3 
19605 4 5 22 6 25.2 MC2 
17653 3 13 19  24.2 MC1 
13128 5 6 22 2 23.6  
17655 1 5 25 4 23.0  
17633 3 9 18 2 22.0  
19602 2 5 20 5 21.6  
13232 11 4 13  19.8  
13032 8 7 8  16.8  
13021 6 3 9 4 15.8  
 
The three worst MCs were identified based on the number of failures using the weighted average 
method. The three MCs are MC17653, MC19605 and MC17673. For the remainder of this study, these 
MCs are numbered MC1, MC2 and MC3 respectively, as indicated in Table 3.3. 
3.4.1.3 Data Mining 
As mentioned, Metrorail captures all maintenance and inspection information on a FMMS database. 
The system uses a Structured Query Language (SQL) based program to obtain information from the 
FMMS database, called GQL (General Query Language).  
 
A GQL query was created and used to obtain data from the FMMS, focussing on the replacement of the 
four listed components [70]. For the purpose of this study, the following assumptions were made: 
• That the replacement of a component will be regarded as a failure.  
• That the maintenance activities between replacements will be ignored. 
• That the contribution of scheduled maintenance (between replacements) is insignificant.  
• That replacements of the selected four components are representing the behaviour of the MC. 
• That the data from the FMMS can be trusted and represent the real situation, although Metrorail 
reported that the FMMS was not operating at times. 
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Failure data from 18 March 2003 until 12 August 2013 was used, representing nearly 200 MCs of the 
5M type train. Within this period, 2947 traction motors, 555 supply sets, 587 vacuum exhausters and 
174 compressors were replaced.  
 
A typical dataset from FMMS is shown in Table 6.6 in Appendix D, from which it can be seen that: 
• Components are serialised.  
• The data only focuses on Removal and Replacement (R&R) of components. 
• A job description of the fault symptom is included. 
• Each component can be uniquely identified by means of a serial number. 
• The socket can be uniquely identified by referencing (e.g. 13120.BOG2_TM3 refers to MC 
number 13120, Bogie number 2, traction motor 3). 
 
With reference to Figure 3.4, where the failures for the four listed components are shown over the ten 
year observation period, it can be seen that the number of TM replacements far exceeds the other 
components. Here, a direct assumption could be made that this is the most critical component on a MC. 
However, it must be kept in mind that there are four TMs on a MC and only one pair of TMs is required 
to be functional (as shall be discussed in a later section), but there is only one supply set in a MC, one 
compressor and one vacuum exhauster.  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Rate of Occurrence of Failure plot for all components on all MCs 
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3.4.2 Failure Analysis of Components 
This section will illustrate how the statistical techniques, discussed in the literature review, will be 
applied to model the failure behaviour of the components. The techniques were applied to all the 
components in the three selected MCs (MC1, MC2 and MC3), but only the TMs and later TM3 of MC3 
will be discussed for illustration purposes. The results from the trend tests as well as the failure 
behaviour parameters can be found in Appendix E. 
 
The failure data of the TMs was analysed and failure models determined for: 
• The TMs for the total population where the aim is to sketch the broader picture of the TM failure 
behaviour. 
• The TM of each of the three selected MCs. 
 
The analysis of TM3 of MC3 will be discussed in detail as it was one of the few components where all 
three trend tests were required before a conclusion of a trend could be made.  
3.4.2.1 TM Failures for the Fleet of MCs 
A graphical assessment of the failure behaviour was done for all the TMs combined, where after a failure 
mode analysis (as part of RCM) was done for illustration purposes on all the TMs followed by a detailed 
analysis of all the armature failures. There were 2947 TM failures recorded during the observation 
period and the spread over the ten years observation period is shown in Figure 3.5. The failures for 2003 
and 2013 were not recorded for the full year, therefore the significant lower values for those years. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Yearly number of TM replacements from 2003 to 2013 
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By visually inspection of the ROCOF graph and focussing on the gradient of the TM failures (Figure 
3.4), it can be seen that the gradient is fairly constant and the failure points are in a straight line. With 
such a straight line, a conclusion cannot be drawn as to whether the failures have a trend or not. The 
graphical assessment reveals a random failure rate, as discussed in section 2.3.3.1. 
 
Thus, a quantitative analysis is then done to confirm the outcome of the graphical assessment, and the 
LTT is used to calculate the value of UL : 
where r=2946,  
Tr=3800, and  
Ti=0;71,73,78;79 ……… ,3800  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the calculation, it can be seen that UL is higher than the upper limit (UL >2) and the failures of all 
the TMs combined show strong indication of reliability degradation, which does not correlate with the 
result of the graphical assessment. A possible reason for this mismatch can be that it is more difficult to 
see a trend with so many data points (2947 points) because of the limitations of scaling of the graph. 
The failures data is, therefore, non-homogeneous and the repairable system theory applies. 
 
The Pareto graph for all TM failure modes is shown in Figure 3.6. The failure mode information was 
obtained from the GQL report from which it can be clearly seen that defective armatures contribute 45% 
to the total number of TM failures. This is significant given that the 892 armature failures represent 
nearly half of the total number of TM failures. Furthermore, it can be seen that four failure modes 
(Armature Defective, Commutator Worn, Low Megger Reading, and Fields Earthed) contribute nearly 
80% of the failures on TMs. Most of these failure modes cannot be prevented with traditional PM 
techniques (like CBM), which then calls for predictive models like statistical analysis. 
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Figure 3.6: Pareto graph for all TM failure modes 
From the total number of failures, the inter-arrival events are identified. This reduced the list of failures 
from 2947 to 1001, with the reason for this significant lower number of inter-arrival events being that 
the first failure of every specific TM was disregarded, and only the inter-arrival times between 
consecutive failures could be used. Many TMs failed only once, which means that such failure was 
disregarded when calculating inter-arrival times. 
 
A histogram of the 1001 failures is created to understand how soon after replacement the failures occur, 
which is then compared to the expected life of two years, as recommended by De Wet [71]. Figure 3.7 
summarises these failures and the following can be highlighted: 
• 5 TMs (0.5%) failed within 1 day after replacement. 
• 17% TMs failed before 100 days, 24% before 200 days and 34% before 300 days. 
• 39% of TMs fail before the warrantee period of one year [71]. 
• 59% of TMs fail before the expected two year lifespan. 
• 80% of TMs fail before 1400 days.  
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Figure 3.7: Histogram for all TM failures on all MCs 
This clearly shows an infant mortality failure pattern, which indicates that this analysis can be used to 
plan effective PM interventions. A further analysis for each failure mode can be done in order to 
understand which failure mode contributes the most to infant mortality. This is, however, not within the 
scope of this study, so it will not be discussed further. 
3.4.2.2 TM3 Failures of MC3 
For illustration, only the calculations done to determine the failure behaviour of TM3 on MC3 is shown, 
where the inter-arrival and arrival times for TM3 are shown in Table 3.4. The failure behaviour for the 
other components were calculated using the same method. 
 
Table 3.4: Inter-arrival times and arrival times for TM3 on MC3 
Failure Inter-arrival 
times, days (Xi) 
Arrival times, 
days (Ti) 
Failure truncated 
(Ci=0) or real (Ci=1) 
1 882 882 0 
2 434 1316 1 
3 1946 3262 1 
4 112 3374 1 
5 44 3418 1 
6 383 3800 0 
3.4.2.2.1 Graphical Assessment of the Failure Behaviour for TM3 
The graphical procedures, as defined by Ascher and Feingold [29], will be used in the TM3 example, 
where it will be shown whether the system is deteriorating or improving:  
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1. Plotting cumulative failures versus cumulative time on linear paper. 
In this plot, the number of cumulative failures are plotted against the cumulative time in a linear 
scale. The ROCOF graph for TM3 on MC3 is shown in Figure 3.8, where two distinct periods 
are visible: 
Period 1: point 1 to 3, steady reliability growth can be observed.  
Period 2: point 3 to 6, deterioration period. 
From the visual assessment, it is inconclusive whether the system is deteriorating, improving 
or constant. Looking at the periods separately, it can be argued that period 1 shows reliability 
improvement while period 2 shows reliability degradation. It is, however, not possible to 
come to a definite overall conclusion with the graphical assessment alone. 
 
Figure 3.8: ROCOF graph for TM3 failures on MC3 
2. Estimating average ROCOF in successive time periods. 
The average ROCOF method, as discussed by Ascher and Feingold [29], will now be illustrated. 
The observation period is split into 2 subintervals of 1900 days each (n=2, Δt=1900), and the 
number of failures in the successive subintervals are calculated as v1=2 and v2=4. In the first 
subinterval (v1), the sum of the inter-arrival times of the first two failures is less than Δt 
(X1+X2=1316), and the sum of the last four observations fall in the second subinterval.  
 
Proper conclusions cannot be made with a low number of subintervals, thus, in order to 
investigate the shortcoming of this procedure, the subintervals are increased to 10 (n=10). The 
results for the different subintervals are reported in Table 3.5 and graphically shown in Figure 
3.9 for n=8,9,10.  
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Table 3.5: Graphical Calculation of average ROCOF for TM3 
  Number of failures in subinterval 
Number of 
Subintervals, 
n 
Interval 
length, Δt 
[days] 
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10 
10 380 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 
9 422 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 
 
8 475 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
 
 
7 543 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 
  
6 633 0 1 1 0 0 4 
 
   
5 760 0 2 0 0 4 
 
    
4 950 1 1 0 4    
   
3 1266 1 1 4 
 
  
 
   
2 1900 2 4 
 
       
 
It can be seen in Figure 3.9, that there seems to be constant ROCOF during the first 2 failures, 
followed by a sharp drop-off in ROCOF caused by the relatively long third inter-arrival time. 
The ROCOF increase sharply towards the end of the observation period and the shortcoming of 
the procedure can be seen when the graph for n=9 appears to become constant, while the graph 
for n=8 still shows an increased ROCOF and the graph for n=10 shows a declining ROCOF. 
 
The emphasis here is that the choice for the subinterval length is important and can influence 
the result of the graphical technique drastically. Care must, therefore, be taken when using this 
graphical technique in isolation. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Average ROCOFs for TM3 for different number of subintervals 
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3. Duane plot. 
The Duane [51] plot was done on a log-log scale, according to the literature review, and the 
results can be seen in Figure 3.10. The straight line can be observed but it must be reported that 
it did not add value towards the interpretation of the failure trend of TM3 in this case. The Duane 
plot however contributed to the understanding of the failure trend of other components, like the 
TM4 of MC2. 
 
Figure 3.10: Duane [51] plot for TM3 
3.4.2.2.2 Calculating the Failure Trend for TM3  
With the graphical assessment inconclusive, the LTT is used to calculate the value of UL for TM3 on 
MC3 with equation (4). From the arrival times in Table 3.4, the UL is calculated as follows: 
 
where r=6,  
Tr=3800, and  
Ti=881,67; 1315,5; 3261,5; 3373,5; 3417,5; 3800.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The UL value falls within the grey area, as 1< UL <2, thus, either the renewal theory or repairable systems 
theory can be applied. Therefore, the L-R test is performed as follows using equation (5): 
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Like the LTT, the L-R test result is also in the grey area, so the MK test is performed next. For simplicity, 
the calculation of equation (6) is shown in the Table 3.6:  
         (6) 
 
Table 3.6: Mann-Kendall calculation for TM3 in MC3 
 
Event 
1 
Event 
2 
Event 
3 
Event 
4 
Event 
5 
Event 
6 
Sum of 
rows 
Inter-arrival times 881.67 433.83 1946 112 44 382.5  
Compare to Event 1  -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -3 
Compare to Event 2   1 -1 -1 -1 -2 
Compare to Event 3    -1 -1 -1 -3 
Compare to Event 4     -1 1 0 
Compare to Event 5      1 1 
 
     S= -7 
 
From Table 6.2 in Appendix B, the MK value is 0.136, using n=6 and S=-7, if α equals 0.05. The MK 
of 0.136 is the probability of obtaining an S-value equal to 7 or larger, when n=6 and no upward trend 
is present. Since the MK value is more than α and S is negative, H0 of no trend cannot be rejected. 
 
It can, therefore, be concluded from the MK test that there is no trend in the failure data with an 86.4% 
confidence factor. It can also be concluded that, although the TM is a repairable component, it will be 
treated as a non-repairable because there was no trend. 
3.4.2.2.3 Parameter Estimation for TM3 
The trend tests suggested that there is no trend in the TM3 failure data. Therefore, the failure arrival 
times are i.i.d. and conventional analysis techniques can be followed. It was mentioned in the literature 
review, that the Weibull is one of the most widely used and flexible lifetime distributions [60]. Thus, 
the Weibull distribution was used to model the failure behaviour for TM3. 
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The data was prepared for linear regression, and the results are listed in Table 3.6. The complete linear 
regression results can be seen in Table 6.5 of Appendix C, where the coefficients in the regression results 
are used to calculate the Weibull parameters, as shown below.  
Table 3.7: Table for parameter estimation for TM3 on MC3 
X 
Rank 
order 
Median 
Rank 
1/(1-Median 
Rank) 
ln(ln(1/(1-
Median Rank))). ln(X) 
44 1 0.109 1.122 -2.155 3.784 
112 2 0.265 1.361 -1.175 4.718 
382.5 3 0.421 1.729 -0.601 5.946 
433.83 4 0.578 2.370 -0.147 6.072 
881.67 5 0.734 3.764 0.281 6.781 
1946 6 0.890 9.142 0.794 7.573 
 
From the equations in Table 2.3 and the linear regression coefficients in Table 3.8, the Weibull 
parameters can be calculated as: 
0.764=1" Variable X" = β  
141.644
)
764.0
943.4()""()(
====
−
−
−−
eee
Interceptc
ββη
 
 
Table 3.8: Linear regression coefficients for the calculation of the Weibull parameters for TM3 
 
 
The reliability of TM3 on MC3 can, therefore, be modelled in terms of its failure behaviour as follows: 
764.0)
141.644
()()(
xx
eexR
−
−
==
β
η
 
3.4.2.2.4 KS Goodness-of-Fit Test for TM3 
From the calculated Weibull parameters, the KS goodness-of-fit test is done for TM3 on MC3 to ensure 
that the confidence of the parameters is within specified significance levels. For the purpose of the KS 
test, Sn is defined by the Weibull failure function as: 
β
η
)(
1)(
t
n etS
−
−=  
Coefficients
Intercept -4.94294
X Variable 1 0.764224
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With six observations and a significant level (α) of 5%, the d value of 0.521 was obtained from Table 
6.3 in Appendix B. The results show that Sn(t) is not a good fit, based on equation (7) for the first data 
point: 
6877.0719.00
521.0166.0719.0521.0166.0
)()()()()( 00
><
+><−
+><− NdtFtSNdtF n αα
 
 
Therefore, the hypothesis that Sn(t) fits F0(t) will be rejected. The Weibull parameters are recalculated 
as follows: 
• Old Weibull parameters: η=644.14, β=0.764 
• New Weibull parameters : η=722.15, β =0.764 
The KS test result based on the recalculated Weibull parameters is shown in Figure 3.11. 
 
 
Figure 3.11: KS test result for TM3 
3.4.3 Failure Analysis of MCs 
For an effective failure analysis of the MCs, a RBD was constructed and the failure behaviour 
determined for each component. The failure analysis, as discussed in section 3.4.2, is applied to all the 
components and the results are reported in Appendix E. In this section, the methodology followed for 
the failure analysis of the MCs is discussed. 
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3.4.3.1 RBD Models for Rolling Stock 
Once the logic of the sub-systems of a MC is understood, a RBD can be constructed and the failure 
characteristics of the different components can be calculated. A MC consists of various sub-systems, 
configured in series and parallel. Although the sub-systems are constituted of several components, a 
basic model was constructed demonstrating the interaction of the four different sub-systems. As 
mentioned, the approach in this study is to construct a basic model where each sub-system is represented 
by a single component, as reflected in section 3.4.1.1. 
 
The details of the selected sub-systems is listed in Table 3.9, and the number of components required to 
survive in either a MC or a train set configuration is indicated. The RBD of a MC is shown in Figure 
3.12, which shows the inter relationship of the components and the redundancy.   
 
Table 3.9: Description of main components and systems of a MC 
   Number required to survive 
Sub-system Component Abbreviation MC Train set 
Power generation Supply set SUPPLY 1/1 2/3 
Compressed air  Compressor COMP 1/1 2/3 
Vacuum system Vacuum 
exhauster 
EXH 1/1 2/3 
Propulsion system Traction motor TM 2/4 6/12 
 
Most of the four components on a MC are connected in series, with redundancy only in the propulsion 
system. The propulsion system consists of four TMs and is best described by a balanced k-out-of-n 
system represented by a series-parallel system, where each bogie on the MC is represented by two TMs 
in series and the bogies connected in parallel. A MC needs to have at least two TMs operating in series, 
which means that the failure of one TM will shut down the other TM on the same bogie but the MC will 
still operate. If another TM will fail in this failed state, the last TM will also be shut down and the MC 
will not operate.  
 
By making use of equations (1) and (2) and with individual reliabilities for each component, the 
reliability of the TM sub-system can be calculated as follows:  
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where R=Overall Reliability, R1=Reliability of TM1, R2 = Reliability of TM2, etc. 
 
Figure 3.12: Simplified RBD for a MC 
3.4.3.2 Analysis of the Failure Trends for MCs 
The failure data for the selected MCs were analysed and a graphical assessment done to determine trends 
in the failure data (refer to Figure 3.13). In the literature review, the use of the ROCOF was explained 
and this is now illustrated for the three MCs.  
 
Figure 3.13: ROCOF plot for all component failures on MC1, MC2 and MC3 
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In Figure 3.13, the combined failures of the four components (TM, COMP, SUPPLY and EXH) are 
shown for the observation period from 2003 until 2013. During the observation period, all three MCs 
were overhauled, which is indicated in Figure 3.13 as GO (General Overhauled).  
 
At first glance, the overall trend looks similar for the three MCs, but there are fundamental differences 
during different periods. Initially, MC2 had seven failures in quick succession followed by three failures 
at a lower rate until the middle of 2007. During the same period, MC1 had 14 failures and MC3 had 17 
failures. During the last period, the failure rate was generally higher for the three MCs, with MC1 and 
MC2 showing a similar failure trend since the beginning of 2012 and had 8 failures each, while MC3 
had 13 failures in the same period. The overall results tend towards a straight line indicating random 
failures, therefore no trend.  
 
The results of a LTT on each MC show that the data is non-committal and no trend present, as shown 
in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10: LTT results for the three MCs 
  MC1 MC2 MC3 
LTT value (UL) 0.14 0.02 0.47 
 
The impact of the GOs on the failure trends must be highlighted, where it can be seen that the failure 
rate of MC2 was significantly lower after the GO, but the failure rate of MC1 and MC3 either steadily 
increased or was significantly higher after the GO. It turned out that the GOs on MC1 and MC3 were 
done by the same supplier and it must be questioned whether the GO contributed to reliability as 
expected. 
 
The danger associated with using the MTBF without taking the chronological order of the failures into 
account, was discussed in section 2.3.3. It can be seen, from the discussion above, that the failure rates 
for the MCs are different for the different time periods. The LTT shows no trend but when the time 
periods are isolated, it can be concluded that the visual inspection showed an increasing trend for all 
MCs at the end of the observation period, in particular, MC3 where the failure rate was higher than the 
other two MCs during the last period.  
3.4.3.3 Failure Behaviour of MCs  
In Section 3.4.2, the failure analysis methodology was applied to TM3 on MC3, and similarly, the failure 
behaviour of the rest of the components of MCs1, 2 and 3 were determined and the results reported in 
Appendix E.  
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A problem identified was that all components have one or more truncated failure observations (also 
called suspensions), where the last failure data points of the data set are not failures but merely the end 
or beginning of the observation period. The addition of these truncated failure observations was done to 
compensate for the shortcoming in the LTT (as described in section 2.3.3.2.2). 
 
The LTT is performed on the components of the three selected MCs and where the LTT results were in 
the grey area, the L-R and MK tests were performed. The same methodology is followed for all the 
MCs, but for simplicity, only the results for MC3 are reported in Table 3.11 and the full results can be 
seen in Appendix E.  
 
It can be seen from the LTT results, that the compressor, vacuum exhauster and TM4 have reliability 
degradation trends. By using the LSE method, the data was fitted to either the power law NHPP or the 
log linear NHPP function. The LTT results were non-committal for the supply sets, traction motor 1 and 
traction motor 2. For these equipment, the renewable theory HPP was followed, and the failure data was 
fitted to the Weibull distribution using the linear regression method. The LTT results for TM3 was in 
the grey area (UL=1.73) and the L-R test was no more conclusive (ULR=1.59). Furthermore, with the 
MK test it was concluded that there was no trend (S=-7, MK=-0.136) with an 86.4% confidence level, 
the final conclusion being that the HPP with the Weibull distribution will be the best fit. The Weibull 
parameters were calculated using the LSE method and adjusted according to a 95% KS goodness-of-fit 
test, as η=722.15, β=0.764.   
 
Table 3.11: Failure distribution parameters for the main components of MC3 
Component LTT LTT implication Failure Behaviour Parameters 
SUPPLY -0.41 Non-committal Weibull η=956.6 β=0.408 
COMP 2.71 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear NHPP α0=-8.1975 α0=0.00086 
VE 3.03 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear NHPP α0=-8.9519 α0=0.00112 
TM1  -0.33 Non-committal Weibull η=1441.5 β=0.733 
TM2 0.15 Non-committal Weibull η=876.5 β=1.046 
TM3 1.73 Grey area After additional tests, HPP concluded.  
Weibull η=722.15 β=1.046 
TM4  2.20 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear NHPP α0=-12.4974 α0=0.00181 
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For each component, the KS test was used to determine the goodness-of-fit. The null hypothesis of the 
KS test states that the data follow the specified distribution, which was rejected when the KS statistic 
(Dn) was greater than the critical value for the KS test (based on a confidence level of 95%). 
 
3.4.4 Failure Analysis of Train Sets 
Once the failure behaviours for all the components were determined, the RBD of a train set could be 
constructed. Details of the sub-systems are listed in Table 3.9 and the number of components required 
to survive in a train set is also indicated, where redundancy is evident.  
 
The RBD for a train set, consisting of 3 MCs, is shown in Figure 3.14. It can be seen that more 
redundancy is present in this configuration compared to a single MC. The supply set, vacuum exhauster 
and compressed air systems are best described by k-out-of-n systems, where two out of three sub-systems 
are required to be operational for the system to be functional and equation (3) is used to model their 
behaviour. 
3
2
3
2
3
2
 
Figure 3.14: Simplified RBD for a 3MC train set 
The failure behaviours for the different components for the different MCs were then simulated in the 
RBD configuration over time, and the results are reported in Chapter 5. 
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4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
In the previous chapters, the literature for reliability was discussed and applied on component level, MC 
level and train set level. The RBM model was also discussed. In this chapter, the model is used to 
quantify the reliability of components, MCs and a train set at Metrorail as a case study. 
4.1 Discussion of Reliabilities in the Case Study 
An analysis was done for the three individual MCs and a train set, made up from these three MCs in the 
configuration, as shown in the RBD model in Figure 3.14. The reliabilities were calculated using 
Microsoft® Excel, with the calculated failure behaviours and parameters of components from section 
3.4.2.  
 
The reliability of the train set and a comparison of the reliabilities of the MCs are reported in Figure 4.1. 
It becomes clear that each of the three MCs follows a different reliability trend, where for approximately 
200 days, MC2 was the most reliable where after it degrades to less reliable than MC1 and MC3. It can 
also be seen that there is an initial sharp deterioration in the reliability of MC3, which will be discussed 
later in this section.  
 
The current maintenance strategy of Metrorail was discussed in section 3.3.2 as well as the differences 
between the A-Shed, B-Shed and C-Shed maintenance interventions. As discussed,  the A-Shed does 
not add value to the reliability of a MC as it consists of inspection tasks related to safety of the train set, 
and no maintenance is performed. During the B-Shed and C-Shed maintenance interventions, 
maintenance is performed on different systems according to the check sheets, but the contribution of the 
maintenance towards reliability is not quantified.t.  
 
Because of redundancy in the MCs, the reliability of the train set is higher than the reliability of any of 
the individual MCs (refer to Figure 4.1). From the plot in Figure 4.1, the time period for a reliable life 
(also called warranty time) can be derived, e.g. the warranty period over 14 days are 92.5% for MC1, 
94.7% for MC2 and 83.2% for MC3. The overall warranty period for the train set is 99.1% over 14 days, 
which is higher than any of the individual reliabilities of the MCs. The implication of the train set 
reliability is that this train set can only guarantee a reliability of 99.1% over a 14 day period. This equates 
to almost one train run in every 100 train runs which will be affected by the unreliability of the train set. 
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Figure 4.1: Reliability of a train set and the individual reliabilities of MCs 
The individual reliability plots for MC1, MC2 and MC3 are shown in Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 and Figure 
4.4. Unlike a train set, the reliability of a MC will be less than the reliability of any sub system, owing 
to the serial relationship between the components (refer to Figure 3.12). It can be seen in Figure 4.4 that 
the reliability of MC3 shows an initial sharp decline, and that the supply set contributes to this decline 
in reliability. Throughout the observation period, the reliability of the supply set is significantly lower 
than the other sub-systems, thus, negatively impacting the reliability of MC3. It follows that a Weibull 
distribution with η=956.6 and β=0.408 and the steep reliability degradation can be expected with such 
a low β-value.  
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Figure 4.2: Reliability of the individual sub-systems compared to the reliability of MC1 
 
Figure 4.3: Reliability of the individual sub-systems compared to the reliability of MC2 
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Figure 4.4: Reliability of the individual sub-systems compared to the reliability of MC3 
The propulsion system (consisting of four TMs in a sub-system) of MC1 is shown in Figure 4.5. The 
effect of the series parallel TM configuration can be seen where the reliability of TM3 is degrading 
faster than the other TMs, but still the reliability of the TM sub-system is relatively high. The reliability 
of the TM sub-system and the individual TMs after 14 days are listed in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Reliability of TM sub-system and individual TMs of MC1 after 14 days 
TM1 TM2 TM3 TM4 TM sub-system 
97.78% 99.72% 89.83% 99.85% 99.74% 
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Figure 4.5: Reliability of the propulsion system for MC1 
4.2 Prediction of Failures 
In the next section, the prediction of failures will be illustrated.  
 
In the first illustration, the prediction of a component failure will be done based on the historic failure 
behaviour. The original failure observation period was from 18 March 2003 until 12 August 2013, and 
this failure data was used to model the failure behaviour of the component. During 2014, more failure 
data was collected from Metrorail, which will be used to validate the failure prediction. Only two 
components were replaced on the three selected MCs, and it was a simultaneous replacement of two 
TMs on one bogie (TM1 and TM2 on MC3) on 22 May 2014 (refer to last entries in Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.2: Replacement history of TMs on MC3 
TM1 on MC3 TM2 on MC3 
Date Xi Date Xi 
18-03-2003 Note1 18-03-2003 Note1 
09-07-2004 479.0 09-07-2004 479.0 
23-05-2005 318.7 23-05-2005 318.7 
12-08-2013 Note2  3002.3 28-09-2006 492.8 
22-05-2014 Note3      283.0 18-10-2012 2212.0 
 
 22-05-2014 Note3      580.5 
Note1- start of observation period, truncated failure observation 
Note2- end of observation period, truncated failure observation 
Note3- additional observation point, replacement of component  
 
Using equation (8), where Γ(n) represents the gamma function, the value for n is obtained from the 
Gamma Table 6.4 in Appendix B and the mean life of TM1 and MC2 are calculated as follows: 
Failure prediction for TM1 on MC3:  
( )
days
x
x
x
failuretotimeTE
5.902
6261.05.1441
364.2.5.1441
733.0
11.5.1441
11.)]([
=
=
Γ=






+Γ=






+Γ=−− βη
 
This can be compared to the actual inter-arrival time of the failure of 283 days, which means that the 
TM lasted 619.5 days shorter than expected. Various reasons can be given for this, but the most likely 
reason could be that the truncated failure observation (Note 2 in Table 4.2) caused a distortion of the 
failure trend. 
 
Failure prediction for TM2 on MC3: 
( )
days
x
x
x
failuretotimeTE
6.628
7172.05.876
956.1.5.876
046.1
11.5.876
11.)]([
=
=
Γ=






+Γ=






+Γ=−− βη
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
75 
 
This can be compared to the actual inter-arrival time of the failure of 580.5 days, which means that the 
TM only lasted 48.1 days shorter than predicted. 
 
Lastly, the failure prediction of the train set will be done using a single distribution representing the 
failure behaviour of the complete train set. Using the cumulative failure distribution, F(x) can be 
calculated and a single distribution fitted using the LSE method. The NHPP was chosen and the 
parameters for the log linear NHPP and power law NHPP distributions calculated, K-S goodness-of-fit 
test performed. It was concluded that the power law NHPP has the best fit to the failure data. The failure 
behaviour of the train set can, as illustrated in Figure 4.6 below, be best described by: 
)(
212
12),( ββλ TTeTTR −−=
 where λ= 0.000282 and β=1.355. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Single cumulative failure distribution for the train set, F(t) 
The expected number of failures, the reliability of the train set and the MTBF can be calculated for 
different time periods from the power law NHPP formulas in Table 2.4. It can be calculated, for instance, 
that the first failure of the train set will occur after 415.8 days and the reliability will then be 37%. Other 
examples are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Illustrative failure values for the train set based on a single distribution  
Time, T2 
[days] 
E2(T2) MTBF(T2) R(T2) 
14 0.01 1388.6 98.99% 
1000 3.28 30.44 3.74% 
415.8 1.00 416.08 36.88% 
 
It can be concluded that failure predictions can be done, and as in the case study, with mixed success. 
The use of a single distribution representing a train set can be validated against failure data over a longer 
period. 
4.3 Contribution of Maintenance to Reliability 
Up to now, the contribution of maintenance was ignored and the reliability graphs for the component, 
MC or train set was done based only on the historical failures of the components. The contribution of 
maintenance interventions towards reliability is not quantified, and the contribution to reliability is 
dependent on the type of maintenance intervention (i.e. A-Shed, B-Shed or C-Shed). 
 
The reliability of a train set and MCs are shown in Figure 4.1. When the periodical maintenance 
schedules as defined in Table 3.1 are integrated into the timeline, typical reliability graphs can be 
obtained as shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. The maintenance schedule in Table 3.1 is an A-B-A-C 
schedule based on a two week interval. It can be seen that with maintenance, the reliabilities of the MCs 
and train set do not tend to zero but tend to be closer to a horizontal line, dependant on the value added 
by the maintenance interventions.  
 
The contribution of the C-Shed (RC-Shed) towards reliability is most likely twice the contribution of the 
B-Shed (RB-Shed) towards reliability [72]. Five scenarios as shown in Table 4.4 were tested. The impact 
of maintenance is illustrated and it can be seen in the table that the overall reliability, 100%, is reached 
when the contribution of a C-Shed is 4%.  
  
In Figure 4.1, the overall reliability on day 406 is 25% if no maintenance is done. These reliabilities can 
be compared and an optimum scenario selected. For example, the reliability of scenario 5 is 100% after 
406 days, which is not feasible owing to the cost considerations and the consequence of imperfect 
maintenance. 
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Table 4.4: Quantify the value adding of maintenance activities 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario4 Scenario 5 
A-Shed 0 0 0 0 0 
B-Shed 0 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 
C-Shed 0 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0% 
R(406) 25.0% 55.4% 81.6% 97.0% 100.0% 
 
If the example is followed where the train operations department requires a hypothetical reliability of 
98%, the train set reliability with objective function can be optimised by determining the intensity of 
the maintenance shedding interventions. It can be calculated that: 
98.0%))11.3%,55.1(406 ==== −− ShedCShedB RRfR , with RC-Shed=2 x RB-Shed, not taking the mean or 
standard deviations of the train set reliability over the period into account. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Reliability of train set with R(B-Shed)=1% and R(C-Shed)=2% 
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Figure 4.8: Reliability of train set with a R(B-Shed)=1.5% and R(C-Shed)=3% 
4.4 Application of the Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) Model 
The opening statement of the first chapter is that “an effective rail system depends on the seamless 
integration of a number of complex systems, and if one system fails, the service can be severely 
affected”. Failures of systems contribute to unreliability, and complex systems can include rolling stock, 
infrastructure, train operation systems and facilities. The relevant departments and role players can make 
use of the RBM model to manage physical assets. The train operations department can, for example, 
quantify their expected reliability in terms of the percentage successful missions completed, where a 
successful mission is defined as a train run without failure. Successful missions can be related to the 
punctuality target, and the relevant departments can then claim an agreed proportion of the allowed 
unsuccessful missions, then plan the reliability of their assets accordingly. 
 
In section 3.2, the international punctuality benchmark was given as 95% on time, where on-time is 
defined as arrival at the final destination within 5 minutes. If the train operation department, for example, 
requires 95% successful missions, and it is agreed that the rolling stock maintenance department can 
claim 2% of the 5% unreliability, then the rolling stock maintenance department must maintain a 98% 
reliability of the fleet. They can use the RBM model to set up a reliability model, which is described in 
seven steps and illustrated in Table 4.5: 
• Step 1: Calculate the reliabilities of all the MCs in the fleet according to the RBM model. 
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• Step 2: Sort the reliabilities of the MCs from large to small based on e.g. 14 days. 
• Step 3: Categorise the MCs in terms of reliabilities into three groups, e.g.: 
o Group A means very good reliability and requires less maintenance. 
o Group B average reliability. 
o Group C means bad reliability and requires more maintenance. 
• Step 4: “Build” train sets from each group, e.g.: 
o Build “good” train sets from the MCs in Group A. 
o Build “average” train sets from the MCs in Group B. 
o Build “bad” train sets from the MCs in Group C. 
• Step 5: Based on the agreed unreliability (e.g. 2%), determine the different maintenance 
intervals and maintenance intensity for the different groups of train sets. 
• Step 6: Maintain the groups of train sets according to the RBM Schedule, calculated for each 
group. 
• Step 7: Monitor the reliability of each MC continuously and move the MC to other groups if the 
reliability increases or decreases. 
 
Table 4.5: Illustrating the application of the RBM concept in maintenance planning 
  
MC 
number 
Arbitrary 
Reliability 
R14days 
Train set 
number 
Arbitrary train 
set reliability 
R14days 
Maintenance 
Schedule 
G
ro
u
p 
A
 
 
(R
>
90
%
) 
MC101 0.90 
Train set 1  98.7% 
6 weeks 
MC102 0.90 
MC103 0.92 
MC104 0.95 
Train set 2 99.6% MC105 0.92 
MC106 0.94 
G
ro
u
p 
B 
(80
%
<
R
<
90
%
) MC107 0.85 
Train set 3 97.1% 
4 weeks 
MC108 0.88 
MC109 0.81 
MC110 0.86 
Train set 4 97.8% MC111 0.83 
MC112 0.89 
G
ro
u
p 
C 
(R
<
80
%
) 
MC113 0.78 
Train set 5 96.2% 
2 weeks 
MC114 0.71 
MC115 0.74 
MC116 0.65 
Train set 6 95.5% MC117 0.63 
MC118 0.57 
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In this study, the reliabilities of only three MCs were calculated and the same can be done for all the 
MCs in the fleet. The concept of RBM is illustrated in Table 4.5, where the reliabilities of 18 MCs are 
ranked and six train sets are made up from these MCs. Train set 1 and 2 are classified as “good” train 
sets (group A), which will require less frequent maintenance interventions, i.e. every six weeks. Train 
set 3 and 4 from group B are classified as “average” train sets and will require more frequent 
maintenance than Group A, i.e. every four weeks. Lastly train set 5 and 6 are classified as “bad” train 
sets requiring frequent maintenance, i.e. every 2 weeks. 
 
The reliability of the train fleet must be agreed upon by the train operations department and the rolling 
stock maintenance department. It is indicated in Figure 4.9 that the guaranteed reliability of the original 
train set (consisting of the original MC1, MC2 and MC3) over a 14 day period will be 99.2%, reaching 
97.8% after 28 days.  
 
Figure 4.9: Reliability during a 35-day window for train set and the individual MCs 
  
0.992 
0.978 
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5 CONCLUSION 
The management of engineering assets becomes more critical in asset intensive organisations. 
In this study, the reliability of a rail transportation system was quantified for an aging fleet. The 
objective of the study was to develop a scientific approach to quantify the reliability of the 
rolling stock fleet in order to develop a maintenance planning model based on system reliability. 
Although various reliability methods and techniques are available for the reliability engineer, a 
Reliability Based Maintenance (RBM) model was selected as it is effective in modular 
engineering asset applications. This model uses failure statistics of components, sub-systems 
and systems.  
 
The research methodology followed made use of failure statistics, failure distributions and the 
interdependence of different systems to determine the impact of component failures on the 
overall system reliability. The individual reliabilities of MCs could be determined and specific 
train sets built according to reliability ratings. The selection of components took into account 
factors such as risks, likelihood of failure and consequence of failure. Trend analysis techniques 
were extensively used to assist with the selection of the most appropriate failure distribution. 
Similarly, parameter estimation techniques were used to determine parameters while goodness-
of-fit tests were used to ensure parameter integrity. Seeing that train sets consist of PTs and 
MCs, the contribution of PTs to the reliability of train sets could not be ignored. Thus, the 
failures of the MCs are modelled representing the train sets. The RBD model that was 
constructed for the MC and the train sets made use of redundancy in the system. Various 
reliability scenarios were also simulated using Microsoft® Excel.  
 
This model, which was validated with real data, helped to illustrate how the reliability measure 
can be used to determine maintenance intervals of different train sets. Based on the results, 
recommendations are made in relation to future planning of the maintenance strategy. The value 
proposition of the RBM model was demonstrated in a maintenance planning application. It was 
shown how reliability values of all MCs can be ranked into various groups after which train 
sets can be built from “reliable” MCs, working down the order of reliability values, finishing 
with train sets build from “less reliable” MCs. It was also shown how maintenance intervals 
can be suggested to suit the different groups of train sets and how the value-added by the 
maintenance function, can be managed by optimising both the reliability intensity of the ABC-
Sheds as well as the time between maintenance intervals. The RBM model could also predict 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
[Document title] 
 
82 
 
component and train set failures. The model illustrated ways how an agreed reliability of 
hypothetical 98% can be achieved by ensuring that the contribution of planned maintenance 
interventions is effective and supports the reliability targets. 
 
With regard to the objectives of this study, it can be concluded that a scientific model was 
developed to quantify the reliability of the rolling stock fleet, in lieu of cancelations and delays 
and; that a maintenance planning model was developed for railway rolling stock based on 
system reliability. The RBM model developed can also complement current maintenance 
techniques such as CBM, in focussing the maintenance effort where it is required most. In so 
doing, the reliability of the train sets can be increased, ultimately providing a reliable and 
punctual service to the commuter. 
 
Future work 
In the course of this study, other areas were identified that may be worth investigating in the 
future: 
• The RBD could be expanded to contain more components while balancing the 
contribution of each system.  
• Additionally, future models should accommodate components with low or no number 
of failures in the observation period, by using techniques like the Bayesian approach.  
• Metrology could also be used as real time CBM inputs into the model whereby the 
“theoretical” age of the component will be compared to the environment and other 
measurements and flagged when inconsistencies are detected. Although the model in 
this study was done in Microsoft® Excel, a live model can add more value as it would 
calculate the failure behaviour after each failure.  
• Finally, the contribution of maintenance can be studied and each maintenance activity 
quantified in order to understand the contribution of maintenance to overall system 
reliability. 
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6 Appendices 
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Appendix A : ROCOF Graphs for All Components 
Appendix A summarises the failure behaviours of the different components found on the Metrorail 
train sets. Failure behaviours are represented by graphs showing the Rate of Occurrence of Failures 
(ROCOF) and the components for each MC is grouped separately.  
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ROCOF graphs for components on MC1 
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ROCOF graphs for components on MC2 
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ROCOF graphs for components on MC3 
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Appendix B: Statistical Tables 
In the literature review, references are made to statistical tables used by the Laplace Trend Test, 
Mann-Kendall trend test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test and the Gamma table from the 
gamma function. The tables are referenced from various sources. 
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Table 6.1: Values of zα corresponding to α for the Cumulative Normal Distribution [52] 
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Table 6.2: Probabilities for the Mann-Kendall Nonparametric test for trend [52] 
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Table 6.3: Kolmogorov-Smirnov critical d-value [73] 
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Table 6.4: Gamma Table for the Gamma function [19] 
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Appendix C: Detail Regression Output Results for TM3 on MC3 
Parameter estimation for the two parameter Weibull distribution can be done with linear regression. 
This appendix shows the regression output results from Microsoft® Excel used to calculate the 
parameters for the TMs for MC3.  
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Table 6.5: Detailed regression output results for TM3 on MC3 
Linear Regression is used to calculate the parameters β and η for the two parameter Weibull 
distribution. 
 
  
LINEAR REGRESSION SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.99046
R Square 0.98101
Adjusted R Square 0.97627
Standard Error 0.16331
Observations 6
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 5.51179 5.51179 206.66743 0.00014
Residual 4 0.10668 0.02667
Total 5 5.61847
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept            -4.94294 0.31612 -15.63607 0.00010 -5.82064 -4.06524 -5.82064 -4.06524
X Variable 1      0.76422 0.05316 14.37593 0.00014 0.61663 0.91182 0.61663 0.91182
RESIDUAL OUTPUT
Observation Predicted Y Residuals
1 -2.05097 -0.10465
2 -1.33695 0.16168
3 -0.39830 -0.20324
4 -0.30206 0.15478
5 0.23989 0.04203
6 0.84494 -0.05060
0.764=
1" Variable X" = β
141.644
)
764.0
943.4(
)""(
)(
=
=
=
=
−
−
−
−
e
e
e
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β
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Appendix D: Typical Data Set from FMMS 
Maintenance data is entered in a Facility Maintenance Management System currently used by 
Metrorail. The data is accessed by building a query extracting the data from the SQL database. 
Surprisingly, the data is well indexed and there is too much data available. This appendix shows a part 
of the data extracted from the database. 
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Table 6.6: Typical raw data set from FMMS 
 
 
 
  
Job Title Facility Code Fmmsctn Job Reference.Description Serial Number Date Act End
EXHAUSTER, R&R 10M30016M_UNDER_EXH Oil Level Low EXHS#914501/39 28-11-2002 10:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13120_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective TMOS#262804 18-03-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13120_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMOS#262804 18-03-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51515M_BOG1_TM1 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMCB#313971 12-05-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51515M_BOG1_TM1 Armature Defective TMCB#313971 12-05-2003 00:00
MA/MG, R&R 13543_UNDER_AUX_SUPPLY Test / Examination  17-05-2003 00:00
COMPRESSOR, R&R 17667_UNDER_COMP Weak CMPR#35857 21-05-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13159_BOG2_TM3 Ext. Cables /Connections / Boxes Def TMCB#289574 28-05-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13138_BOG1_TM1 Low Megger Reading TMOS#261920 30-05-2003 00:00
MA/MG, R&R 13186_UNDER_AUX_SUPPLY Brushes Worn / Chipped / Sticky MALT#LB453P 30-05-2003 00:00
EXHAUSTER, R&R 13139_UNDER_EXH Weak EXHS#111470 30-05-2003 00:00
COMPRESSOR, R&R 19605_UNDER_COMP Weak CMPR#34967 31-05-2003 00:00
COMPRESSOR, R&R 17624_UNDER_COMP Bearing Failure CMPR#35886 03-06-2003 00:00
EXHAUSTER, R&R 17671_UNDER_EXH Excessive Dirt - Exterior EXHS#913870/154 03-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M50469M_BOG2_TM4 Armature Defective/ Earthed TNCB#302983 04-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17635_BOG2_TM4 Ext. Cables /Connections / Boxes Def TMCB#15D1298 04-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M50469M_BOG2_TM4 Armature Defective TNCB#302983 04-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13542_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective  05-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 13542_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective/ Earthed  05-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M50469M_BOG2_TM3 Arc Horn Flashed / Burnt / Broken TMCB#303070 06-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMCB#15D1487 06-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective TMCB#15D1487 06-06-2003 00:00
MA/MG, R&R 13193_UNDER_AUX_SUPPLY Test / Examination MALT#15D2080 09-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG1_TM2 Armature Defective TMOS#262040 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG2_TM4 Armature Defective TMOS#262065 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG1_TM2 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMOS#262040 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG1_TM1 Armature Defective TMOS#262590 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG1_TM1 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMOS#262590 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 10M51518M_BOG2_TM4 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMOS#262065 11-06-2003 00:00
MA/MG, R&R 10M50468M_UNDER_AUX_SUPPLYAuxiliary Transformer Defective MALT#PB762K 11-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM4 Int. Cables / Fields / Interpoles Flash TMCB#15D1343 17-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM4 Int. Cables / Fields / Interpoles Def TMCB#15D1343 17-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM3 Int. Cables / Fields / Interpoles Def TMCB#283594 17-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17651_BOG2_TM3 Int. Cables / Fields / Interpoles Flash TMCB#283594 17-06-2003 00:00
TRACTION MOTOR, R&R 17644_BOG2_TM3 Armature Defective/ Earthed TMCB#281482 18-06-2003 00:00
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Appendix E: Results for Trend Tests and Failure Behaviour Parameters 
The steps in applying statistical techniques were discussed in the Methodology chapter and this 
appendix summarises the trend test results as well as the failure behaviour and parameters. 
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Results for Trend Tests and Failure Behaviour Parameters 
 
The results for the three MCs are listed in the following three pages, and throughout the following 
standard is followed: 
• Inter arrival times (Xi) are marked in bold indicate truncated failure observations. These truncated 
failure observations were added either to the beginning, the end or both ends of the observation 
period. In most cases the added observation is larger than the original first/last observation point. 
• Where no failure data exists, failure behaviour from another MC is taken, e.g.: 
o No data for COMP MC1, data used from COMP MC3 
o No data for TM3 MC2, data used from COMP MC2 
• The evaluation of the Laplace Trend Test (LTT) and Lewis-Robinson (L-R) test results are 
interpreted according to Table 2.1, repeated below for ease of referencing 
 
Value of u Description Type of theory 
-2< UL<-1,  
1< UL <2 
Grey area, more tests required Either renewal theory or repairable 
systems theory 
UL <-2 Reliability improvement, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory, use 
NHPP 
UL >2 Reliability degradation, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory, use 
NHPP 
-1< UL <1 Non-committal, data 
homogeneous 
Renewable theory, use HPP 
• The LTT test results are reported in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7: Test results for the Laplace Trend Test for MC1, MC2 and MC3 
 SUPPLY COMP EXH TM1 TM2 TM3 TM4 
MC1 2.033  1.600 -0.228 0.243 0.700 1.117 
MC2 0.834 -0.362 1.354 2.418 0.818  1.364 
MC3 -0.412 2.707 3.025 -0.328 0.361 1.730 2.203 
Colour Legend -1<u<1 
-2<u<-1, 
1<u<2 
 <-2 >2  
 
• When no conclusive trend could be found by the LLT and L-R test, then only the Mann-Kendall 
trend test is used. 
• Based on the results from the trend tests, either non-repairable (renewal) or repairable system 
theories are used, where:  
o Non- repairable/renewal systems are associated with HPP, and conventional analysis 
techniques are used such as the Weibull distribution 
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o Repairable systems are associated and NHPP, and either the Log-Linear or Power law 
NHPP failure functions are used. 
• Trend tests are performed and failure behaviour parameters calculated 
• No Power law functions were found to be optimal for any component, and where NHPP are used, 
only Log-Linear functions will be seen in the results although the tests have been done to fit the 
data to either Power law or Log-Linear NHPP.  
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Results for MC1 
 
 
Instead of indicating truncated or real failures with a C value (Ci=0 for truncated failures and Ci=1 for 
real failures), the truncated inter-arrival times are shown in bold. 
 
  
Motor Coach MC1 MC1 MC1 MC1 MC1 MC1 MC1
Component SUPPLY COMP EXH TM1 TM2 TM3 TM4
Inter-arrival times (X i) 2571.7 396.0 806.7 806.7 806.7 867.7
(BOLD  indicates truncated 252.8 135.5 142.8 748.8 61.0 2286.8
failure observations) 733.5 105.9 594.0 2244.5 2794.8 645.5
1096.0 2256.5 137.5
122.2
26.9
678.9
162.0
447.5
154.5
66.0
119.0
Laplace Trend Test 2.033 1.600 -0.228 0.243 0.700 1.117
Lewis Robinson test 1.428 1.467
Mann-Kendall (MK S-statistic) -20 -4
STD Deviation 1223.9 317.1 913.9 847.3 1274.7 890.4
Mean 1186.0 292.5 950.0 1266.7 950.0 1266.7
Coeff of variation 1.03 1.08 0.96 0.67 1.34 0.70
MK Confidence Factor 87.40% 83.30%
No trend No trend
Failure Model NHPP HPP HPP HPP HPP HPP
Failure Behaviour Log Linear Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Β /α0 -8.69976 1.062652 0.872486 1.237035 0.491688 1.314011
η/α1 0.000759 279.9794 1083.868 1603.679 1312.138 1950.916
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Results for MC2 
 
 
Instead of indicating truncated or real failures with a C value (Ci=0 for truncated failures and Ci=1 for 
real failures), the truncated inter-arrival times are shown in bold. 
 
 
  
Motor Coach MC2 MC2 MC2 MC2 MC2 MC2 MC2
Component SUPPLY COMP EXH TM1 TM2 TM3 TM4
Inter-arrival times (X i ) 1398.5 104.0 1379.0 1706.5 722.4 1844.5
(BOLD  indicates truncated 435.0 325.0 586.5 492.0 880.1 1469.0
failure observations) 1691.1 1047.0 62.0 567.0 330.0
648.4 1215.9 460.0 1519.0
239.6 385.6 140.0 349.2
1362.0 209.2
Laplace Trend Test 0.834 -0.362 1.354 2.418 0.818 1.364
Lewis Robinson test 1.695 2.317
Mann-Kendall (MK S-statistic) -4
STD Deviation 657.2 496.3 557.4 569.4 486.2 265.5
Mean 1174.9 621.0 725.8 595.8 760.1 1656.8
Coeff of variation 0.56 0.80 0.77 0.96 0.64 0.16
MK Confidence Factor 75.80%
Stable
Failure Model HPP HPP HPP NHPP HPP HPP
Failure Behaviour Weibull Weibull Weibull Log Linear Weibull Weibull
Β /α0 1.250553 1.081816 0.662057 -8.09434 1.518403 5.594382
η/α1 1456.854 702.557 1022.546 0.000773 890.6089 1776.94
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Results for MC3 
 
 
Instead of indicating truncated or real failures with a C value (Ci=0 for truncated failures and Ci=1 for 
real failures), the truncated inter-arrival times are shown in bold. 
Motor Coach MC3 MC3 MC3 MC3 MC3 MC3 MC3 
Component SUPPLY COMP EXH TM1 TM2 TM3 TM4
Inter-arrival times (X i ) 643.4 2378.0 2369.0 479.0 479.0 881.7 3418
(BOLD  indicates truncated 5.0 330.5 179.5 318.7 318.7 433.8 383
failure observations) 815.1 117.9 417.9 3002.3 492.8 1946.0
396.0 7.2 312.0 2212.0 112.0
1880.5 141.8 100.0 44.0
368.0 10.0 382.5
392.6 338.6
Laplace Trend Test -0.412 2.707 3.025 -0.328 0.361 1.730 2.203
Lewis Robinson test 1.590
Mann-Kendall (MK S-statistic) -7
STD Deviation 702.5 826.0 822.3 1505.3 894.4 708.0 2146.1
Mean 748.0 533.7 532.4 1266.7 875.6 633.3 1900.0
Coeff of variation 0.94 1.55 1.54 1.19 1.02 1.12 1.13
MK Confidence Factor 86.40%
No trend
Failure Model HPP NHPP NHPP HPP HPP HPP NHPP
Failure Behaviour Weibull Log Linear Log Linear Weibull Weibull Weibull Log Linear
Β /α0 0.408353 -9.178058 -5.767402 0.733074 1.008155 0.764224 -12.4974
η/α1 956.609 0.00132 0.00050 1441.491 1025.889 644.141 0.00181
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Appendix F: Conference Article CIE 2012  
 
In 2012, a conference paper was done for Computers and Industrial Engineering 42 Conference, held 
in Cape Town. The tile is “Exploring Critical Failure Modes in the Rail Environment and the 
Consequential Costs of Unplanned Maintenance”. 
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Appendix G: Journal Article Submitted to SAIJE  
A journal article was submitted, in October 2014, to The South African Journal of Industrial Engineering 
(SAJIE). By the time of submitting this research work, there was no feedback yet from the journal, and 
the article is attached. The title of the article is “Quantifying system reliability in rail transportation in 
an ageing fleet environment”. 
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QUANTIFYING SYSTEM RELIABILITY IN RAIL TRANSPORTATION IN AN AGEING FLEET ENVIRONMENT 
 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the management of physical assets has become increasingly important, even more so in 
asset intensive organisations. This article presents an approach to quantify reliability of rolling stock 
assets in the rail environment, making use of failure statistics. Failure distributions and interdependency 
of different systems are used to determine the impact of component failures on the overall system 
reliability, and it is used to determine the reliability of individual train sets. Recommendations relating 
to the future planning of maintenance are included in the article.  
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Die bestuur van fisiese bates het in die afgelope tyd al meer belangrik geword, veral in bate intensiewe 
organisasies. Hierdie artikel stel ‘n metode voor wat die betroubaarheid van rollende materiaal bates in 
die spoor bedryf kwantifiseer deur gebruik te maak van falingstatistiek.  Falings verspreidings en 
interafhanklikheid van stelsels word gebruik om te bepaal wat die invloed is van komponent falings op 
die betroubaarheid van die totale stelsel. Hierdie benadering word dan gebruik om die betroubaarheid 
van individuele treinstelle te bepaal. Aanbevelings word ook gemaak hoe om betroubaarheid te gebruik 
om die beplanning van instandhouding te doen. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An effective rail system depends on the seamless integration of a number of complex systems, and if 
one system fails, the service can be severely affected. Reliability, availability, maintainability and safety 
(RAMS) are seen as major contributors to the quality of railway service (Figure 1) and are well covered 
in the European standard EN 50126 [1]. The standard recognises that railway safety and availability are 
interlinked and regarded as the most important elements, and it can only be achieved if all the reliability 
and maintainability requirements are achieved. The quality of railway service is not only influenced by 
the four RAMS elements, but also operations, maintenance and other factors as shown in Figure 1.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Factors contributing to the quality of a railway service [1]. 
While all the elements of RAMS are important in the management of railway physical assets, in this 
article, the focus will be on quantifying the reliability of railway rolling stock and the application of 
reliability techniques to define a forward looking and leading reliability measure. As a case study, the 
method is applied using data from a South African rail operator, who operates an aging rolling stock 
fleet predominantly using time based maintenance. The article also discusses the method used to decide 
on the maintenance intervals while applying the leading reliability measures. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Concept of reliability  
The word reliability developed from the word rely, which is defined as a ‘sense of dependence or trust 
and perhaps has a notion to fall back on’ [8]. It was first used as early as 1816 by the poet Samuel T 
Coleridge, who wrote about his friend who inspired everybody around him with ‘perfect consistency 
and absolute reliability’ [9]. Since then, the concept of reliability has become rather popular and is used 
extensively by the general public as well the technical community.  
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When used by the technical community, the context and interpretation of the word becomes rather 
specific and can deviate substantially from the popular meaning. There are divergent definitions for 
reliability but one of the more appropriate and recently used definitions in the context of asset reliability 
is ‘the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a specific interval under stated 
conditions’ [1]. At a first glance, the definition seems to be self-explanatory and misinterpretation 
appears improbable, but stakeholders need to ensure that the concepts of intended function, the duration 
of the specific interval and the scope of stated conditions are well understood. 
 
Reliability analysis is a systematic approach to analyse the reliability of systems, identify and access the 
frequency and causes of failures, and control the consequence of failures [21]. There are many reasons 
why reliability is important among them reputation, customer satisfaction, operation and maintenance 
cost, repeat business and for a competitive advantage [20]. But from a maintenance point of view, 
reliability will contribute to a higher availability which is particularly important in the context of RAMS. 
 
2.2 Reliability, availability and the human factor 
As part of RAMS, availability is considered one of the most important reliability performance measures 
of maintained systems [19]. Availability requires that the item must be ‘in a state to perform the required 
function under given conditions…’ [1][42]. The importance of reliability and availability in the rail 
industry is best described by Milutinovic [42] who quantifies the influence of reliability on availability. 
Reliability and availability are often misinterpreted and in certain cases erroneously used 
interchangeably.  
 
Reliability can be grouped into the reliability of equipment and the reliability of people [43]. In EN 
50126 [1], the contribution of humans to railway RAMS is acknowledged and more rigorous control of 
the human factors is called for. Studies have been done on human factors that include the influence of 
human reliability on systems. Karanikas [43] concluded that human errors contribute to more than three 
quarters of failures during the life of an asset and stated that ‘expecting to achieve perfection from an 
imperfect human is unrealistic’. Vanderhaegen [44] describes the human behavioural degradation when 
performing tasks and system degradation due to human actions. Without ignoring the importance of 
human reliability, in this article, the focus will be primarily on the reliability of equipment regardless of 
the cause of failure.   
 
As stated, reliability is important but it should not be pursued at any cost. Ultimately, the cost of 
reliability needs to be weighed against the total combined operation and downtime cost. 
 
2.3 Reliability and maintenance 
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Maintenance of industrial equipment is defined by Pintelon and Gelders [18] as ‘all activities necessary 
to restore equipment to, or keep it in, a specified operating condition’. The objective of maintenance is 
to maximise equipment availability by improving the reliability of the system [18] through scheduled 
preventative maintenance, replacements and inspections (PMRI) [19]. Asset intensive organisations 
should recognise the importance of an effective maintenance function. However, in many organisations, 
maintenance is seen as an expense account [17] and not a value adding process able to increase 
reliability. 
 
Pham and Wang [24] realised that not all maintenance activities improve the condition of an item, and 
categorise maintenance according to the degree to which the operating conditions of an item is restored. 
They define the following types of maintenance: 
• perfect maintenance - which restores the operating condition of the system to as-good-as-new,  
• minimal maintenance - which leaves the condition as-bad-as-old, 
• imperfect maintenance - which brings the condition somewhere between the bad-as-old and good-
as-new condition, 
• worse maintenance - which brings makes the system failure rate or actual age increases without 
breakdown, 
• worst maintenance - which unintentionally causes a failure or breakdown.  
 
Possible causes identified by Pham and Wang [24] for imperfect, worse or worst maintenance include 
the repair of the wrong part, partial repair of the fault, replacement with faulty parts and human error. 
 
Traditional maintenance practitioners believed that most failures of equipment are age related and a 
common mistake was to use a single maintenance strategy for all equipment. Failure models are often 
used to select the most appropriate maintenance strategies, and most of the six traditional failure curves 
for aging equipment [26] can be managed by periodic time based maintenance activities [28]. Some 
failures, however, cannot be prevented even by applying the best maintenance strategy, thus, such 
failures need to be predicted using statistical methods. This approach forms the focus of this article. 
 
2.4 Reliability in the rail context 
Many studies have been done on railway reliability and the effect thereof, such as the relationship 
between reliability and productivity in railroad services [63], the importance of railway reliability to 
convince drivers of passenger vehicles to switch to public transport [64], the effect of unreliability on 
travel time [65], overcrowding because of delays and the effect thereof on productivity and efficiency 
of workers [66] and the effect of reliability on the availability of the service [42]. Railway reliability can 
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be measured in different ways such as the punctuality of the service [63], cancellations and delays [2] 
and the number of realised connections between trains [2].  
 
From a passenger’s perspective, the punctuality of the service is often used as a reliability measure, 
which is defined as the probability that the train will arrive at the final destination within a certain margin 
of the scheduled arrival time. The average punctuality of some major European metro railroad operators 
is around 95% [67] where trains arrive at the final destination within the international margin of five 
minutes, although some operators use a three minute margin and still manage a punctuality of around 
95%. In South Africa, the punctuality of the Metrorail railway system was 84.5% in 2011 [67] based on 
five minutes, which has room for improvement compared to international benchmarks.  
 
Studies clearly show that reliability is important to railroad companies, thus, the consequence of 
unreliability cannot be ignored. It is also clear that most reliability measures are based on the 
performance of the rail service and are lagging indicators, which cannot be related to the source of the 
unreliability. Lagging indicators show how well the assets were managed whereas leading indicators are 
forward looking and help manage the performance of an asset [43]. 
 
3. MODELLING RELIABILITY 
3.1 Systems and theories 
Calculating the reliability of a system requires the mathematical modelling of the system in terms of the 
underlying driving factors. When constant reliability values are used, a snapshot of system reliability is 
given at a specific time, and when time dependent reliability expressions are used, the system reliability 
can be observed over a period of time [19]. 
 
Systems can be classified as non-repairable or repairable. A non-repairable system is discarded after its 
first failure [26][46] and modelled using the renewal theory. With the renewal theory, the system is 
replaced after a failure and the condition restored to the good-as-new condition, and failures are 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The renewal theory is not only limited to non-repairable 
systems because even if a system can physically be repaired (defined as a repairable system), it can still 
produce failure data that is i.i.d. and can therefore be classified as non-repairable [47].  
 
Normally, a repairable system is not renewed to the good-as-new condition but minimally repaired to 
the bad-as-old condition by the repair or replacement of the failed component(s) [26]. If the failure data 
has a trend, the condition of the system can deteriorate (or improve) over time and must be modelled 
using regression techniques [26]. More about trend testing is discussed later in this article. 
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The uncertainty associated with reliability can be classified as aleatory or epistemic uncertainty. 
Epistemic uncertainty represents failures caused by a lack of knowledge of the system and can be 
represented by mathematical structures such as interval analysis, possibility theory, evidence theory and 
probability theory [48]. Epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by better understanding the system such 
as by experimental results or physical models. Aleatory uncertainty is related to randomness and is based 
on the mathematical structure of probability [48], which is the primary focus of this article.  
 
3.2 Overview of system reliability and RBDs 
For more comprehensive insight into the reliability of a system, it is important to be well versed with 
the configuration of the system and the interaction between the system and its larger domain systems as 
well as its peer systems, sub-systems and components. Bourouni [21] describes a number of reliability 
assessment techniques and compares the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) to other reliability 
assessment techniques. He describes the RBD as the most logical and natural representation of a system 
showing how units (components or sub-systems) are logically linked in series, parallel or combinations 
thereof.  
 
When units are linked in series, the failure of any unit results in system failure, thus, the reliability of a 
series system is the product of the individual reliabilities, represented by:  
∏
=
=
n
i
iRR
1
 (1) where n is the total number of units in the system, Ri is the individual reliability values 
 
Units linked in parallel allow for redundancy and the system remains operational even if only one unit 
is operational. The reliability of a pure parallel system can be calculated from the individual 
unreliabilities as shown below. 
∏
=
−=
n
i
iFR
1
1 , (2) where n is the total number of units in the system and Fi represents the individual 
unreliability of each unit defined as 1-Ri. 
 
Unlike a pure series system where the failure of a single unit results in system failure, or where a single 
unit needs to be operative in a parallel system, there are special variations where the system only operates 
when a certain number of units are operative in a certain sequence (k-out-of-n system) [20]. There are 
three variations of the k-out-of-n system comprising the consecutive-, balanced- and general k-out-of-n 
system.  
 
In the series configuration, the consecutive k-out-of-n system only fails if more than k consecutive units 
have failed [19]. In a balanced k-out-of-n system the failure of one unit can force the shutdown of another 
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unit when in a particular arrangement [19]. In the general k-out-of-n system, redundancy can be built 
into parallel systems where the system is operational when at least k units out of a total n units are 
operational, and the reliability of the system can be calculated as follows:   
∏ ∏∑ ∏
=
+=
j
w
y
yj
l i
i RFRR
1
)]([
 [19] 
where l is the total number of possible combinations,  
i : items required to survive 
j : items allowed to fail 
w : total number of units in the system 
 
The general case of k-out-of-n systems is often adequate to model a system and the pure series and 
parallel systems are special cases of the general case of k-out-of-n system. When the system is 
operational when only one unit is operational, it can be denoted by the general case of 1-out-of-n system, 
which in turn is a pure parallel system. When the system is only operational when all the units are 
operational, it is a general case of n-out-of-n systems simplified by a series system.   
 
3.3 Reliability data and selection of failure distributions 
Reliability is considered as the science of failures [21] and the purpose of the reliability engineer is to 
analyse trends in failure data and determine the Rate of Occurrence of Failures (ROCOF) as accurately 
as possible. The ROCOF represents the number of failures per unit time. A common erroneous approach 
used by reliability engineers is to use only the mean time between failures (MTBF) in calculating the 
ROCOF, ignoring the chronological order of failure events. The result thereof is that an assumption is 
indirectly made that failures occur randomly over the given period, and the opportunity to model failure 
trends is lost.   
 
A practical model for the analysis of failure data, modified by Coetzee [49], is shown in Figure 2. It 
suggests that before a failure distribution can be fitted, failure data should first be tested for a trend and 
with no trend present, the dependency of failures should be determined. Vlok [31] observes that the test 
for dependence is most often omitted because a large number of failure observations are required to 
perform the test with reasonable confidence, and therefore, independence is normally assumed. 
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Figure 2: Model identification framework [29,49]. 
An informal graphical assessment of a trend in failure data is to plot the cumulative number of failures 
versus the cumulative system operating time. The graph is known as the ROCOF plot [50], and if the 
ROCOF is constant, the plotted points will roughly be aligned, hence, the times between successive 
failures are identically distributed (marked ‘IID’ in Figure 3). If the times between successive failures 
are decreasing, the curve presents a trend with larger increments in the number of failures per unit time, 
and the tail end of this curve indicates reliability deterioration (marked ‘Deterioration’ in Figure 3). 
Reliability growth is the opposite when the times between successive failures are increasing and the 
graph concaves down with smaller increments in the number of failures per unit time (marked ‘Growth’ 
in Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Graphical assessment of a trends in failure data (ROCOF plot [50]). 
A simple trend validation can be performed by inspecting the data set using various techniques. The 
Laplace Trend Test (LTT) [26][31] is the most extensively used test for data sets, and was therefore 
chosen for this purpose. For failure data which end in a failure, the trend parameter u can be calculated 
by: 
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where T1,T2,…,Tr = arrival times of failures,  
r = total number of observations [26][31] 
 
 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) for the Laplace test is that the distribution of the arrival times corresponds to a 
Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP) if the rejection criteria are met [53]. The rejection criteria are 
based on a standard normal distribution assumption, and will reject H0 if u>zα/2  or u<-zα/2 [53]. Based 
on a typical 95% confidence level (α=5%), H0 will be rejected if u>1.96 or u<-1.96, and if u=0 it means 
that the trend is a horizontal line. 
 
Coetzee [26] interprets the value of the Laplace value u in Table 1, and from the results the type of 
theory can be selected. Once the renewable theory or repairable system theory is selected, a family of 
distributions can be selected and the parameters determined with the most appropriate method.  
 
Table 1: Interpretation of Laplace value UL [26] 
Value of u Description Type of theory 
-2<u<-1, 1<u<2 Grey area Either renewal theory or 
repairable systems theory 
u<-2 Reliability improvement, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory 
u>2 Reliability degradation, data 
non-homogeneous 
Repairable system theory 
-1<u<1 Non-committal, data 
homogeneous 
Renewable theory, HPP 
 
When the Laplace u value is within the grey area, further tests can be performed. Without discussing in 
detail the Lewis-Robinson test [53], Mann test [54], Weibull test, Carroll-Hung method [55] can be used 
to determine whether the data has a trend. 
 
As discussed earlier, systems can be classified into non-repairable and repairable systems.  These are 
discussed in detail in the sections below. 
 
3.3.1 Non-repairable systems  
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The failure data for a non-repairable system is i.i.d. based on the LTT test, and failures in the data set 
can be assumed to come from the same statistical distribution, independent from one another. The data 
is homogeneous, can be represented by various standard distributions and the renewal theory applies.  
A variety of distributions can be used to model homogenous failure data and the Weibull distribution is 
one of the most commonly used and flexible lifetime distributions [60], as shown below.  
β
ηβ
ηη
β )(1)()(
x
e
x
xf
−
−
=
 [26] 
 
Substantial research has been done on more effective distributions such as by Unkle and Venkataraman 
[61], who found synergy between the Weibull and the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA) models. Xie and Lie [62] developed an additive Weibull distribution to represent the bathtub-
shaped failure rate data with a single distribution that is related to the exponential and Weibull 
distributions. For the same purpose, Xie et al [62] developed the new Weibull distribution, and when 
β<1, the lifetime data has a bathtub shaped hazard rate function.  
 
Similar to the case of repairable systems, the reliability and related functions can be derived for the 
Weibull distribution. The exponential distribution, that assumes a constant failure rate, is a special case 
of the Weibull distribution with β=1 and λ=1/η. It can be seen that the Weibull model is flexible and can 
be expanded or simplified. In the Weibull distribution, the β and η parameters can supply valuable 
information regarding the component in question.  
 
The LTT already confirmed that the life data is independent and identically distributed and the shape 
parameter (β) can provide an indication whether the hazard rate is increasing (β>1) or decreasing (β<1). 
The η is the characteristic life, which is an indication of the expected life and also of the age at which 
63.2% of the components will fail [26].   
 
3.3.2 Repairable systems 
When a system is subjected to imperfect maintenance, the system suffers from reliability degradation 
with an increase in the ROCOF. These are repairable systems, represented by non-homogenous data and 
can best be modelled by the non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) [26][49][31]. The NHPP is 
generally suitable for the purpose of modelling data with a trend, relatively easy to use and have been 
tested fairly well [49]. Two formats of the NHPP found in literature is the log-linear NHPP, represented 
by  
t
etp 10)(1 αα += , with 0,, 10 ≥∞<<∞− tαα  [26][31] 
and the power law NHPP, represented by  
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1
2 )( −= βλβttp , where 0,0, ≥> tβλ .  [26][31] 
 
The NHPP repairable systems are best modelled with α1>0 (log-linear NHPP) and β>1 (power law 
NHPP), and a linearly increasing failure rate when β=2 (power law NHPP) [26]. System reliability, the 
expected number of failures and MTBF can be calculated from the NHPP models as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: NHPP equations for repairable systems for the interval (T1,T2) [26][49][31] 
 Log-linear NHPP  
with 0,, 1210 ≥≥∞<<∞− TTαα  
Power law NHPP  
with 0,0, 12 ≥≥> TTβλ  
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number of 
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The estimation of the parameters from life data can be done using techniques such as the least-squares 
estimation (LSE) and the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), and a test such as the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test can be used to determine the goodness-of-fit. However, this is not the primary purpose 
of this article and is not discussed further. 
 
4 METHODOLOGY FOR MODELLING RELIABILITY 
In the literature review, the importance of measuring and managing reliability is discussed and different 
methods are discussed to calculate reliability. The methodology followed to calculate the reliability of 
a system is presented in this section, summarised in Figure 4. It consists of three steps starting with the 
creation of the model and ends with the interpretation of the results. Each step is discussed in more detail 
below and applied in the case study. 
 
 
Figure 4: Methodology followed for calculating reliability. 
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Step 1 : Identification of systems and creating RBD’s 
The first step is to analyse the system, simplify the systems and identify the important sub-systems. It is 
important that the contribution of sub-systems towards reliability, their interaction with other sub-
systems as well as redundancy be understood. The optimal assignment of components for every sub-
system is also important and the sub-systems must be balanced. 
 
Step 2 : Collecting and processing of data 
Once the sub-systems and components are identified, the best source of failure data must be identified, 
data extracted and analysis techniques used to determine relationships within the data sets (data mining). 
Techniques such as the Laplace trend test is used to search for trends in data sets, and failure distributions 
are then fitted to the data accordingly. There are various software packages available which can process 
data easily but Microsoft® Excel was preferred for all the data processing 
 
Step 3 : System analysis and results 
Once the interaction of sub-systems is known, RBD’s are created and failure distributions determined 
for the components. The system can then be analysed. Again, Microsoft® Excel was used to simulate 
the performance of the system over a period of time, and the contribution of components and sub-
systems to system reliability could be identified.  
 
5 CASE STUDY 
The methodology is discussed in the previous section and it is demonstrated by means of a case study 
where the reliability of rolling stock at Metrorail (a subsidiary of the Passenger Rail Service of South 
Africa (PRASA)) was modelled. Metrorail operates an aging fleet of trains, some in operation since 
1958, and they predominantly use of cancellations and delays as a reliability measure for their fleet [67].  
 
5.1 Train set configuration 
Metrorail defines a Motor Coach (MC) as a powered rail vehicle able to pull unpowered passenger 
trailers (PT) and also able to transport passengers. A typical Metrorail train set consists of nine PTs and 
three MCs, with one MC in the middle and at both ends of the train set. The contribution of PTs towards 
the reliability of a train set is insignificant compared to the contribution of the MCs, therefore, for the 
purpose of this article, the train set is represented by three MCs only.  
 
A MC consists of various sub-systems, configured in series and parallel.  Although the sub-systems are 
constituted of several components, a basic model was constructed demonstrating the interaction of four 
different sub-systems (refer to Table 3). Although a risk analysis based on the impact and probability of 
occurrence, would have been more effective in identifying the components within each sub-system, the 
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approach in this study is to construct a basic model where each sub-system is represented by a single 
component. The reasons why these components are specifically selected for the MC model are: 
• each component is the main component in the respective sub-system 
• the components are either an electric motor or driven by an electric motor 
• these components combined contribute to more than 60% of cancellations and delays of 
rolling stock at Metrorail [67].   
• these components are serialised, repaired by Metrorail and failure data is available  
 
5.2 RBD Models 
The details of the selected components are listed in Table 3 and the number of components required to 
survive in either a MC or a train set is indicated. The RBD of a MC is shown in Figure 5, which shows 
the inter relationship of the components and the redundancy.   
 
Table 3: Description of main components and systems of a MC. 
   Number required to 
survive 
Sub-system Represented by Abbre
viatio
n 
MC Train set 
Power generation Auxiliary power 
supply generator 
AUX 1/1 2/3 
Compressed air  Compressor COMP 1/1 2/3 
Vacuum system Vacuum 
exhauster 
VE 1/1 2/3 
Propulsion system Traction motor TM 2/4 6/12 
 
Most of the components are connected in series on a MC with redundancy only in the traction motors 
(TMs). The TMs are best described by a balanced k-out-of-n system represented by a series-parallel 
system, where each bogie on the MC is represented by two TMs in series. A MC needs to have at least 
two TMs operating in series, which means that the failure of one TM will shut down the other TM on 
the same bogie.   
 
By making use of equations (1), (2) and with individual reliabilities for each component, the reliability 
of the TM sub-system can be calculated as follows: 
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where R=Reliability, R1=Reliability of TM1, R2 = Reliability of TM2, etc. 
 
Figure 5: Simplified RBD for a MC. 
The RBD for a train set, consisting of 3 MCs, is shown in Figure 6. It can be seen that more redundancy 
is present in this configuration compared to a single MC. The power generation, vacuum and compressed 
air systems are best described by k-out-of-n systems, where two out of three sub-systems are required 
to be operational for the system to be functional.  
3
2
3
2
3
2
 
Figure 6: Simplified RBD for a 3MC train set. 
 
5.3 Collecting and processing of data 
Once the logic of the sub-systems is understood and a RBD constructed, the failure characteristics of 
the different components can be calculated. Failure data from 2004 until 2013 was used from Metrorail’s 
FMMS (Facility Maintenance Management System) to determine life distributions and the data 
represents nearly 200 MCs of the 5M type train. It was reported by Metrorail that the data is not complete 
as the FMMS was not operating at times, thus, the assumption is made that the available data represents 
the real situation. For the purpose of this article, three MCs were selected with the worst failure data 
during the observation period.  
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For simplicity, failure data was limited to the replacement of components only, i.e. perfect maintenance, 
ignoring any maintenance done in between the replacements. All components have one or more 
truncated failure observations (also called suspensions), where the last failure data points of the data set 
are not failures but merely, the end or beginning of the observation period.  
 
The ROCOF graph for the exhauster of MC3 is shown in Figure 7. Three distinct periods are visible: 
• Point 1 to 3, where reliability growth can be observed  
• Point 3 to 5, deterioration period 
• Point 5 to 7, reliability growth 
 
The u factor for the LTT was calculated as 3.03, which indicates a strong overall reliability degradation 
trend over the observation period. So, although it seemed like the three periods were predominantly 
reliability growth periods, it is important to validate the data by performing trend tests. 
 
The LTT is performed on the components of the three selected MCs and where the LTT results were in 
the grey area, the Lewis Robinson and Mann tests were used.  The same methodology is followed for 
all the MCs, but for simplicity only, the results for MC3 are reported in Table 4.  
 
 
Figure 7: Failure data plot for MC3 exhauster. 
 
 
It can be seen that the compressor, vacuum exhauster and traction motor 4 have reliability degradation 
trends. By using the LSE method, the data was fitted to either the power law NHPP or the log linear 
NHPP function. The LLT result were non-committal for the auxiliary equipment, traction motor 1 and 
traction motor 2. For these equipment, the renewable theory HPP was followed and the failure data fit 
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to the Weibull distribution using the linear regression method. The LTT results for the traction motor 3 
was in the grey area and the Lewis Robinson test was no more conclusive (U=1.55). Furthermore, with 
the Mann test, it was found that there was no trend (Mann Kendall Statistic=-7, Coefficient of 
Variation=1.12). It was, therefore, concluded that the HPP with the Weibull distribution will be the best 
fit, and the Weibull parameters calculated using the LSE (η=644.1, =0.764).   
 
Table 4: Failure distribution parameters for the main components of MC3. 
Compo
nent 
LLT LTT implication Failure 
Behavior 
Parameters 
AUX -0.41 Non-committal Weibull η=956.6 =0.408 
COMP 2.71 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear 
NHPP 
α0=-8.1975 α0=0.0008
6 
VE 3.03 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear 
NHPP 
α0=-8.9519 α0=0.0011
2 
TM1  -0.33 Non-committal Weibull η=1441.5 =0.733 
TM2 0.15 Non-committal Weibull η=876.5 =1.046 
TM3 1.73 Grey area Additional tests required 
TM4  2.20 Reliability 
Degradation 
Log Linear 
NHPP 
α0=-12.4974 α0=0.0018
1 
 
For each component, the KS test was used to determine the goodness-of-fit. The null hypothesis of the 
KS test states that the data follow the specified distribution, and it was rejected when the KS statistic 
(Dn) was greater than the critical value for the KS test (based on a confidence level of 90%). 
 
6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
An analysis was done for three individual MCs and a train set, made up from the three MCs. The results 
and a comparison of the reliabilities are reported in Figure 8. It becomes clear that the reliability of MC2 
and MC3 follows a similar trend, with MC1 initially higher than MC2 and MC3 but then reducing to be 
significantly less reliable than MC2 and MC3.  
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Figure 8: Reliability of a train set and the individual reliabilities of MCs.  
From the plot in Figure 8, the time period for a reliable life (also called warranty time) can be derived. 
Because of redundancy in the MCs, the reliability of the train set is higher than the reliability of any of 
the individual MCs. For example, the warranty time for the MCs over 14 days are 95.5% for MC1, 
94.8% for MC2 and 83.0% for MC3. The overall warranty time for the train set is 99.3% over 14 days, 
which is higher than any of the individual reliabilities of the MCs. This, however, shows that this train 
set can only guarantee 99.3% reliability over a 14 day period, which can have an impact on punctuality, 
cancellations and delays.  
 
The reliability of MC3 shows an initial sharp decline. In Figure 9, the sub-systems of MC3 are shown 
and it can be clearly seen that the auxiliary equipment has a significantly lower reliability than the other 
sub-systems. It follows a Weibull distribution with η=956.6 and =0.408 and with such a low  value, 
the steep reliability degradation can be expected.  
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Figure 9: Reliability of the individual sub-systems compared to the reliability of MC3. 
At Metrorail, the train sets are maintained every 14 days, and both the maintenance and operations 
departments expect a high level of reliability during the 14 day cycle. The train operations department, 
who operates the train sets, can quantify their expected reliability in terms of the percentage successful 
missions completed, where a successful mission is defined as a train run without failure.  
 
This percentage successful missions can be used by the maintenance department as a reliability target, 
and by using the reliability model as described in this article, the reliability of the train sets can be 
quantified based on failure statistics and compared to the reliability target.  
 
7 CONCLUSION 
Based on the results presented in this article, it can be concluded that system reliability for rolling stock 
in the rail environment can successfully be quantified. This reliability measure is a leading indicator and 
the source of unreliability can be identified. Based on lifetime data and the interdependence of different 
systems, the overall reliability and the contribution of each component on the entire system can be 
calculated. It is also shown how time dependent reliability expressions are used to study the reliability 
over the life of the system.  
 
Instead of using time based maintenance, maintenance schedules can now be created based on the 
reliability of individual train sets. Train sets that meet the reliability target can be scheduled for 
maintenance less frequently than train sets that do not meet the target. This will not only increase the 
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availability of train sets but also refocus the efforts of the maintenance department on the less reliable 
train sets. This provides a different approach to maintenance management for aging rolling stock fleets, 
which, and with the abundance of failure statistics, can contribute to RAMS in rolling stock. 
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